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resource use within DoD and each military service. 
Moreover, recent federal legislation identifies DoD 
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This report analyzes the organizational structure of 
Marine F&ES to establish effectiveness and output measure 
baselines. It then compares the baselines with 
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structure, shows potential to reduce labor costs and 
enhance emergency service capability. 
Considering the critical contributions of Marine F&ES 
to installation and contingency operations, the author 
recommends a combined Aviation/Ground stakeholder review of 
Marine F&ES consolidation as part of ongoing force 
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1 
optimization initiat                    
I. BOUNDARIES OF THE BUSINESS CASE 
A. GOALS AND VISION 
Much common familiarity regarding Defense optimization 
efforts is associated with the 2005 Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) review. While the BRAC process serves as a 
clear example of efforts to achieve better use of limited 
DoD resources, this process is one of several major ongoing 
Defense Transformation initiatives.1 Likewise, optimization 
of installation support services is clearly a priority for 
DoD and each of the services.2
Efficiencies gained in installation support may 
contribute to increased resources available to Combatant 
Commands and warfighting efforts. Therefore, efforts to 
optimize installation support services can be expected to 
continue.  
As part of the optimization of installation support 
services, changes in operational concepts (organizational 
change/restructuring) may prove valuable for increasing 
organizational efficiency and increasing program 
effectiveness.3  This process involves the identification of 
organizational, program or installation redundancies and 
consideration of alternatives. 
Appendix I provides an overview of the Defense 
Transformation Act (DTA), with specific focus on 
ives. The DTA legislation identifies  1 Jones, L.R., Transformation of National Defense Business 
Management: Current Initiatives and Future Challenges, p. 14 
2 Government Accountability Office (GAO). (1997). Defense 
Outsourcing, Challenges Facing DoD as It Attempts to Save Billions in 
Infrastructure Cost, p. 5 
3 Office of Force Transformation. Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
(2003). Military Transformation, A Strategic Approach, p. 27 
2 
each Marine installat                    
measures to gain efficiencies in DoD Fire and Emergency 
Service (F&ES) programs (through consideration of the 
proposal to allow for the commercial sourcing of F&ES 
alternatives.)4  This Appendix also provides an overview of 
Navy and Marine Corps published strategies that stress 
optimization initiatives. The service strategies examined 
do not exempt any Navy or Marine Corps functions from the 
scope of efforts to gain functional area efficiencies or 
increased effectiveness. 
Considering DoD’s continued emphasis on optimization, 
and service publications that support this overall effort, 
this Business Case Analysis (BCA)5 supports DoD and U.S. 
Marine Corps optimization strategies by examining 
alternative organizational structures to support Marine 
Corps Emergency Services.  The primary research questions 
posed by the author include: 
• What alternative organizational models are viable 
for supporting Marine F&ES operations? 
• What are the costs and benefits of the current 
Marine F&ES organizational structure? 
• Of the viable alternative models, what are the 
costs and benefits associated with each, and how 
do they compare to the costs and benefits of 
current Marine F&ES organizational structure? 
 
Marine installation emergency services differ from 
Naval and Air Force installation emergency services in that 
ion supporting aviation operations, in  4 General Counsel of the Department of Defense. (2003). The Defense 
Transformation For the 21st Century Act, Section 211 
5 United States. Department of Defense. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 
Logistics. (1999). Business Case Model for the DoD Logistics Community: A 




not” being considered                    
whole or part, maintains two separate fire departments.6 
Comparatively, Naval and Air Force installations maintain 
one department per base.  Therefore, there is some 
appearance of capability duplication. However, more 
detailed analysis of the single and dual department 
emergency service structures is required to compare costs 
and benefits, as well as to understand the implications 
associated with Marine F&ES organizational change. 
This analysis is therefore focused on providing the 
following:7  
• Credible assessment of alternative strategies for 
supporting Marine emergency services. 
• Clear rationale for the methodology for assessing 
each alternative.  
• Valid, transparent and persuasive analysis for 
reviewing agencies.  
 
Should the analysis demonstrate a net benefit8 of the 
current Marine emergency service organization, it may serve 
to assist efforts to avoid future changes to the current 
F&ES organizational structure. Conversely, should the 
analysis demonstrate net benefit to be gained from F&ES 
organizational change, it may serve as a basis for further 
examination of F&ES alternatives. 
 
B. CONTEXT AND PERSPECTIVE 
The specific identification of “what is” and “what is 
 in the scope of this analysis, along  6 Civil Service staffed Structural Fire Departments (SFD), Marine 
staffed Aircraft Rescue Firefighting (ARFF) Departments   
7 Franck, R., (2004). Business Case Analysis and Contractor vs. 
Organic Support: A First Principles View, p. 27 
8 The aggregate value of benefits of an alternative less costs 
associated with the alternative 
4 
                    
with an overview of the methodology applied by the author 
is essential to establish a proper context and perspective. 
This section identifies the geographic scope of the 
analysis, costs aspects included and excluded in the 
analysis, the comparative methodology applied in this 
examination and an overview of the stakeholders (those 
potentially impacted by Marine F&ES change and those that 
most significantly contribute to the consideration of 
proposed alternatives). 
 
1. Geographic Scope 
The scope of this examination applies to consideration 
of examining emergency service organizational alternatives 
for the following Marine Air Stations/Bases/Facilities9: 
• MCAF/MCB Quantico, Virginia 
• MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina 
• MCAS New River, North Carolina 
• MCB/MCAS Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 
• MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina 
• MCAS Yuma, Arizona 
• MCAS Miramar, California 
• MCB/MCAS 29 Palms, California 
• MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton, California 
• MCB/MCAF Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii 
Considering organizational change (namely F&ES 
consolidation) in Japan (MCAS Iwakuni and MCAS Futenma) may 
 9 Each of these installations maintains the dual Structural/ARFF F&ES 
organizational structure. 
5 
                     
not be feasible due to the reliance on approximately 220 
Japanese Nationals for Structural Fire Department (SFD) 
staffing. With Japanese staffing, a tremendous 
communication barrier exists that would prove difficult, if 
not impossible for a consolidated department to overcome. 
This suggestion conflicts with the Navy’s bilingual F&ES 
communications requirement.10 However, the author maintains 
this position due to the difficulties associated with 
Japanese/English bilingual communications.  
 
2. Costs Examined 
Fire protection is highly labor-intensive. In Fiscal 
Year 2002, approximately 86% of Marine emergency service 
spending was attributed to labor. Comparatively, 1% of 
total F&ES spending was attributed to equipment, and 6% on 
supplies.11 Accordingly, cost effectiveness means ensuring 
F&ES manpower is utilized efficiently. Therefore, this 
analysis focuses on potential F&ES labor efficiencies 
(management and administration, fire prevention personnel 
and firefighters) subject to avoidance of significant 
negative impact to Marine F&ES capability. Costs associated 
with training and procurement of Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) will be reviewed as well, as both the 
training and equipping of individual firefighters are 
certainly costs associated with changes in work force 
organization. 
 
 10 Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
(2004). OPNAVINST 11320.23F CH-2, p. 12 
11 USMC FY 2002 F&ES Spending (excluding minor spending categories)  




  Command  Total Spending   Personnel    Equipment   Supplies  
MCLB Albany Activities  $      1,812,259   $  1,698,792   $             -   $     17,034 
MCB Camp Butler Activities  $      9,084,518   $  7,889,077   $             -   $   974,149 
MCRD San Diego Activities  $           82,793   $      74,533   $             -   $             -  
MCAS Cherry Point Activities  $      3,578,970   $  3,135,051   $             -   $   363,297 
MCLB Barstow Activities  $      4,062,114   $  3,597,370   $   136,244   $     97,975 
MCAS Beaufort Activities  $      1,387,429   $  1,320,956   $-    $     30,121 
MCB Camp Lejeune Activities  $      9,039,631   $  8,362,500   $   350,627   $   255,295 
MCAS Miramar Activities  $      3,672,413   $  3,135,865   $-    $   482,945 
MCAGTFTC 29 Palms Activities  $      3,255,832   $  3,114,486   $    51,450   $     56,139 
MCAS Iwakuni Activities  $      5,441,759   $  2,745,744   $      5,574   $   467,571 
MCB Quantico Activities  $      4,710,793   $  4,532,656   $             -   $   157,187 
MCAS Yuma Activities  $      2,464,347   $  2,296,152   $             -   $   117,275 
MCB Camp Pendleton Activities  $    10,142,884   $  9,325,350   $             -   $   650,317 
MCB Hawaii Activities  $           46,210   $               -   $             -    $-   
MCRD Parris Island Activities  $      2,795,822   $  2,629,716   $   100,057   $     22,595 
MCAF Quantico Activities  $         185,195   $     184,338   $             -   $         857  
Marine Barracks 8th and I 
Activities  $         110,135   $     110,135   $             -   $             -  
MCAS Camp Pendleton  $      2,625,425   $  1,278,450   $             -   $     66,277 
USMC Headquarters Activities  $    64,498,528   $55,431,170   $   643,952   $3,759,031 
 
Table 1 - USMC FY 2002 F&ES Spending 
 
Costs and potential savings related to Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) are not included in this analysis due to 
their relatively small percentage of expenditure totals. 
Additionally, costs and possible economies associated with 
end items (rescue vehicles, water tenders, etc…) and 
infrastructure (facilities) that may result from 
organizational change are not projected as these costs are 
sunk (Costs for these end items and infrastructure were 
incurred in the past. Also, they are unlikely to change 
regardless of present decisions). 
 
3. Comparative Methodology   
This analysis reviews Marine, Navy, Air Force, and 
Private Industry emergency services to establish 
7 
alternatives. United States Army F&ES has been specifically 
excluded from this analysis as the Army lacks operational 
emphasis on tactical fixed wing aircraft, a common 
denominator shared by Marine, Navy and Air Force operations 
and a shared emergency service requirement. The Private 
Industry review is included as part of Appendix VII, which 
examines commercial F&ES operations supported in 
contingency environments.  
The military reviews are conducted at two levels, both 
macro (armed service) and micro (installation). Appendix II 
and III provide the macro and micro examinations, as 
several sections of this business case reference them as 
supporting material. 
The macro (armed service) level review examines 
overarching DoD and corresponding Marine, Navy and Air 
Force F&ES directives, to identify published operational 
and optimization requirements among the three services. The 
micro (installation) level review is based on Site Visits 
conducted by the author to six DoD Fire Departments within 
California and Arizona (4 Marine Corps, 1 Air Force and 1 
Navy). The Site Visits were completed to compare and 
contrast emergency service organizational structures, core 
capabilities and resource inputs. Moreover they provided an 
opportunity for direct input from each service F&ES 
community regarding costs and benefits of their respective 
organizational arrangements.  
 
4. Stakeholders 
Identification of key stakeholders that influence or 
may be affected by changing the organization of Marine 
8 
Emergency Services is an important aspect of establishing 
the context and perspective.  
Stakeholder segments include three general groupings: 
those impacting the macro administration of emergency 
services (Tier 1), those who serve as F&ES providers (Tier 
2) and potential consumers of the service itself (Tier 3). 
To examine how these segments might perceive Marine F&ES 
organizational change, the following table identifies each 
stakeholder group and postulates the reception of F&ES 
organizational change as either “Pro, Mixed, Opposed or 
Neutral.” Without completing an actual survey within Tier 1 
and 3, stakeholder analysis of these segments relied on the 
















Stakeholders Likely Perception of 
Organizational Change  
Remarks 
DoD Senior Leadership  
Tier 1 
Pro Emphasis of DTA12; change 
promotes force optimization 
Marine Corps Senior 
Leadership 
Tier 1 
Mixed Organizational change may 
support  published  Marine 
optimization strategies13; 
Concerns with risks posed by 
organizational change  
Marine Corps Aviation 
Senior Leadership 
Tier 1 
Mixed Same as 2. 
Air Station & Base 
Commanders  
Tier 1 
Mixed Same as 2.  
Marine Wing Service 
Support Squadron   
Commanders 
Tier 1 
Mixed Same as 2 
American Federal 
Government Employee Union 
Tier 1 
Mixed See Appendix V 
Marine ARFF OIC’s, Civil 
Service Department Chiefs 
Tier 2 
Opposed See Appendix VI 
Firefighters (Military & 
Civil Service) 
Tier 2 
Mixed See Appendix III 
Marine & Transient Pilots 
Tier 3 
Neutral Premium on speed & capability 




Neutral Same as 6. Includes all 
personnel working and or 
living on applicable 
installations. 
 
Table 2 - Stakeholder Identification & Perceptions 
 
The critical nature of emergency services requires 
detailed examination of the current Marine F&ES 
organizational structure and alternatives to provide Tier 1 
and 2 stakeholders with an accurate and comprehensive 
review of the costs and benefits associated with each 
alternative. 
The current dual organizational structure of Marine 
F&ES has been in place for decades, and has proven 
                     12 Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act, (2003) 
13 Concepts and Programs 2005, retrieved October 12, 2005 from 
http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2005/TOC1.HTM  
10 
                    
successful in supporting both installation and deployed 
Marine operations. The difficulty encountered in this 
business case analysis was providing an overall review of 
potential gains and losses, both tangible and intangible 
associated with the alternatives.       
 
C. FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE METRICS 
Not everything that counts can be counted and not 
everything that can be counted counts. 
-Albert Einstein 
Throughout the DoD, effective F&ES ultimately means 
accomplishing the same shared objectives14; 
• Force protection, 
• Safeguarding government infrastructure and 
assets. 
 
Arguably, Marine, Navy and Air Force F&ES 
organizations accomplish these objectives daily in a highly 
professional manner. However, more careful consideration of 
performance measurement15 means examination of both specific 
capabilities provided and resources required by each 
alternative. 
More simply stated, comparing the performance of 
organizational alternatives that provide fire and emergency 
services entails metrics that can be applied to each F&ES 
organizational alternative. Business Case Model for the DoD 
Logistics Community: A Guide to Business Case Development 
 14 Appendix II (Armed Service F&ES Review) 
15 The assessment of effectiveness and efficiency of activities, 
operations and processes in support of achievement of an organization’s 
missions, goals and quantitative objectives through the application of 
out-based, measurable, and quantifiable criteria, compared against an 
established baseline. 
11 
                    
identifies four classes of performance measures used in 
both functional and economic analysis within DoD: 
• An outcome measure assesses actual results, effects, 
or impacts of a program activity. 
• An output measure describes goods or services 
produced and the actual level of activity recorded 
or effort that was realized. 
• An efficiency measure is a ratio of inputs to 
outputs. 
• An effectiveness measure should identify critical 
characteristics of the output that meet customer 
requirements. 
 
The metrics the author has applied in this analysis 
include Effectiveness Measures and Output Measures. 
 
1. Effectiveness Measures 
Effectiveness measures identify critical 
characteristics of the outputs that meet customer 
requirements. The critical characteristics pertaining to 
this business case are emergency service core 
competencies.16   
For each of the alternatives examined, F&ES core 
competencies are identified through examination of 
department mission responsibilities. Once identified, core 
competencies will be measured against an installation’s 
emergency service operating requirements to derive a core 
competency percentage.    
 
 
  16 Areas of specialized expertise that are fundamental to a 
particular job or function. 
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2. Output Measures 
The second measure applied by the author is an 
examination of Output Measures associated with each F&ES 
organizational arrangement. This measure describes the 
service produced and the actual level of activity recorded 
or effort that was realized in execution of the function 
examined.  The level of activity or effort measured is the 
costs of the labor input required to support a given F&ES 
organization.  
Within DoD there are three distinct labor components 
common to each F&ES structure17; (1) Management and 
Administration, (2) Fire Prevention, and (3) Fire and 
Emergency Service personnel (firefighters). In general, DoD 
Instruction 6055.6 (DoD Fire and Emergency Services) and 
subordinate Marine, Navy, and Air Force F&ES directives 
delineate staffing for each F&ES labor component: 
 
• Emergency response personnel authorized in each fire 
department are based on the number and type of 
emergency vehicles needed to meet fire flow and 
travel time response requirements.18 
• Fire prevention personnel are based on the size of 
the installation (space requiring fire risks surveys 
in thousand of square feet). 
• Fire department management and administration 
staffing are based on the size of the department.  
 
 17 United States. Department of Defense. (2000). Department of 
Defense Instruction 6055.6, DoD Fire and Emergency Services Program 
18 Determination of number and types of emergency vehicles and fire 
flow requirements are based on operational and geographic assessment of 
individual DoD installations. See DoDI 6055.6 for specific 
requirements. 
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Emergency response and fire prevention staffing remain 
relatively fixed subject to unchanging fire flow, response 
time requirements and unchanging amounts of space requiring 
fire risks surveys. However, department management and 
administration staffing depends not only on the size of the 
department, but also on how many departments an 
installation maintains. Appendix IV provides a detailed 
overview of the DoD F&ES staffing requirements for all 
military services. 
For each organizational alternative examined, a model 
depicting management and administration, fire prevention, 
and firefighter staffing has been provided. The models 
provide an estimated total annual labor costs for 
comparison.  Staffing of each alternative is based in 
accordance with DoDI 6055.6 requirements.  
 
D. INITIATIVES CONSIDERED 
Improved efficiency in Marine Corps emergency services 
is not a novel concept. This section reviews past 
organizational change initiatives and the outcomes.  
The 1997 Marine Corps Active Duty Force Structure 
Review Group (ADFSRG) identified possible savings from 
integrating Marine aviation and structural firefighting.19 
The ADFSRG proposed merging the two separate fire and 
emergency service organizations (ARFF and Structural Fire 
Fighting) at each installation. The ADFSRG estimated 
integration would save 20% of the station ARFF billets and 
10% of the civilian Structural Fire Fighting (SFF) billets. 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the 
recommendation of the ADFSRG, but provided additional 
 19 Appendix V provides the 1998 Process Action Team Final Report 
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guidance to study the integration due to the varying fire 
and emergency service requirements at Marine bases and 
stations. With this guidance, a Process Action Team (PAT) 
was formed to conduct the study and prepare the final 
report.    
After conducting extensive site visits of ten Marine 
Corps installations, the PAT concluded consolidation of 
Structural and ARFF departments was feasible and provided 
needed personnel savings for reinvestment and 
modernization. Moreover, the PAT recommended a reduction of 
23 civil service and 92 uniformed Marine firefighting 
positions.  
Although the final PAT report includes identification 
of advantages, disadvantages, issues for consideration, 
command perceptions on the initiative and conclusions and 
recommendations associated with Marine F&ES consolidation, 
the PAT report has at least five shortcomings: 
 
• The omission of estimated costs savings 
projections to be gained by consolidating Marine 
fire departments. 
 
• Specification of billets in each department to be 
eliminated. 
 
• Full statement of costs and benefits of the dual 
and consolidated F&ES organizational structures. 
 
• Comparative assessment of current Marine F&ES to 
viable armed service alternatives. 
 
• Measurement and mitigation of risks associated 
with consolidation of Marine F&ES.    
 
15 
The PAT report did not result in changed 
organizational structure for Marine F&ES. Insufficient 
detail, coupled with concern for operational risks by Tier 
I stakeholders and Tier II opposition resulted in status 
quo.  
In addition to this historical perspective, research 
indicates that concerns with F&ES organizational change 
remain within Tier II.  Personal interviews (with two 
Marine ARFF Officers-in-Charge and two Marine Installation 
Civil Service Fire Chiefs) and e-mail responses to a 
questionnaire circulated by the author within Tier II 
demonstrate continued concerns with Marine F&ES 
organizational change. (Statistics pertaining to the 
questionnaire and responses are included for review as 
Appendix VI). 
Tier II leadership concerns regarding potential Marine 
F&ES organizational change provide a “road map” of issues 
for further examination during the evaluation of 
alternatives. Although there are concerns stated with 
organizational change, it should also be noted that Tier II 
stakeholders cited significant potential benefits to F&ES 
organizational change as well. 
 
E. ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 
This Business Case Analysis will examine five 
alternatives for supporting Marine emergency services: 
1. Status Quo (dual ARFF & SFD)   
2. Military Departments  
3. Civil Service Departments  
4. Outsourced Departments 
5. Consolidated Departments  
16 
                    
The examination of the current “status quo” or “as-is” 
organizational arrangement (the dual department structure) 
provides a baseline of costs and performance objectives to 
readily compare alternatives. 
 
F. KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
There are several key assumptions in this analysis.  
The first is that enhancement of F&ES core capabilities 
result from emergency service training, education and 
operational response.  To illustrate this point, consider 
several functions that rely on years of training coupled 
with experience to develop core competency expertise: 
surgery, home construction and software engineering. 
Although training and certification provide essential 
credentialing and skill development in these functions, 
(the performance of surgery, the building of homes, and the 
development of software) repeated execution of these duties 
by doctors, contractors and technical engineers develops 
the core competency expertise highly sought and relied on 
in the commercial sector. The same is true and especially 
critical in emergency services: training and certification 
coupled with actual emergency response provides for F&ES 
expert core competency enhancement.  
Second is acceptance of labor cost metrics applied to 
uniformed Marine and civil service firefighters. Estimated 
2005 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) distributed end 
strength rates have been applied to measure the labor cost 
for each military firefighter.20  This measure delineates 
 20 (2004). Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) Workyear and End Strength 
Rates for January 2004 Update of the Department of the Navy Future 
Years Defense Program (FYDP)  
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non-rank specific estimated costs for pay and allowances 
for officers and enlisted personnel as follows: 
• 2005 Officer $119,054.00 
• 2005 Enlisted $56,626.00 
For civil service firefighters serving in Marine F&ES, 
the author has applied the March 2005 Office of Personnel 
and Management (OPM) United States GS-0081 annual salary 
rates21 of: 
• $62,275.00 (Chief Position, GS-12 Step 8) 
• $41,121.00 (Fire Prevention and Firefighter 
positions)  
The third assumption is that the DoD firefighter 
prohibition, 10 U.S.C. 2465, will remain in effect for 
years to come. Appendix I explores this prohibition 
further. 
Fourth is that there will be a long-term operational 
requirement for expeditionary uniformed Marine 
firefighters, and that the demand for emergency services in 
contingency environments is increasing. Appendix VII 
explores the continued and growing nature of F&ES in 
support of contingency operations, while discussion of 
Alternative 1 elaborates on the expanded role of uniformed 
Marine firefighters. 
Fifth is that the only viable organizational 
alternatives for Marine Corps F&ES are those that sustain, 
support, and provide a working environment for uniformed 
 21 Civil Service F&ES Baseline Costs, retrieved October 12, 2005 from 
http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/
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Marine firefighters when not deployed. One of the hallmarks 
of Marine emergency services is the ability to deploy F&ES 
Marines in support of contingency operations primarily as a 
component of a Marine Wing Service Support Squadron (MWSS) 
in support of forward aviation operations. Considering the  
MWSS operational requirement, any alternative that does not 
sustain forwardly deployed F&ES capability is not 
acceptable.      
The final assumption is that uniformed Marine ARFF 
firefighters may be responsible for a wide variety of 
emergency service situations and needs beyond service to 
aircraft including:  
• Fire Prevention and Inspection Duties 
• Response to Improvised Explosive Device 
Detonations 
• Motor Vehicle Accidents and Extrications 
• Emergency Medical Service Response 
• Structural fires 
• Wild Land Firefighting 
 
This assumption raises the question of whether or not 
the current organizational structure of Marine F&ES is 
generating the “effectiveness outputs” or expert 
firefighting and EMS skills that prepare all Marine Corps 
firefighters for joint response scenarios, and moreover, 
uniformed Marine ARFF personnel for the potential myriad of 
emergency service scenarios inherent to expeditionary 





                    
G. STATUS QUO ACTIVITY (ALTERNATIVE 1)  
1. History and Structure 
A description of the Marine Corps’ current 
organizational structure being considered in this Business 
Case Analysis must be sufficiently detailed so that all 
stakeholders can understand conclusions drawn from the 
analysis. Additionally, the description must be detailed 
enough to assign costs and review performance measures. The 
detailing of the status quo model develops baselines, and a 
picture of what is being examined that will be used to 
compare alternative F&ES structures. In short, the status 
quo model is developed to understand areas affected by the 
proposed alternatives. 
A narrative history of Marine Corps F&ES obtained from 
CWO-4 James R. Casey (USMC retired) provides a reasonably 
accurate overview of existing Marine emergency services.22   
In 1947, Headquarters Marine Corps created a 
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS 7051) for an 
airfield firefighter, the Crash Crewman. This MOS 
also had a secondary duty of structural 
firefighter. Several of the Marine firefighters 
at Parris Island became the first Marine Crash 
Crewmen. Marine firefighters from other bases 
were also assigned the new MOS and left the 
structural fire departments to organize the 
airfield fire departments. Between 1947 and 1949, 
the fire departments began integrating civilian 
fire fighters. During the Korean conflict, the 
Marines were phased-out of the structural fire 
departments and they were staffed with civilians. 
Marines received their training at the Navy fire 
school at Naval Air Station Memphis, TN until 
establishment of the DoD Joint Fire School at 
Goodfellow AFB, TX. 
 22 USMC F&ES History, retrieved October 13, 2005 from 
http://www.lts.net/~hogston/cfrhx.html
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Beginning in the early 1950’s, Crash Crew Marines 
went through several reorganizations in the 
search to provide the best crash and structural 
fire protection to Marine aviation squadrons 
during combat and peacetime deployments. For a 
time they were assigned to Marine Air Base 
Squadrons (MABS) which were attached to either a 
Marine Aircraft Group (MAG), or Marine Wing 
Support Group (MWSG). Each Air Wing attempted 
local solutions such as MABS, Wing Engineer 
Squadron, Wing Equipment Repair Squadron, Wing 
Motor Transport Squadron, Headquarters & 
Headquarters Squadron and Marine Wing Support 
Squadron (MWSS). Headquarters Marine Corps 
finally selected the MWSS concept, placing them 
all in MWSG’s in the mid-1980’s. 
Today, the Marine Corps continues to maintain two 
distinct fire and emergency services (F&ES), one 
for aircraft rescue fire fighting (ARFF) staffed 
by uniformed Marines, and one for structural fire 
and emergency services staffed by Civil Service 
firefighters, our Civilian Marines. The ARFF 
units provide protection for 10 Marine Corps Air 
Stations/Air Facilities and two Auxiliary Landing 
Fields. The Marines also continue to provide 
deployable fire protection by assignment to 10 
Marine Wing Support Squadrons. The Marine fire 
fighting personnel consists of 535 deployable 
billets and 410 others, including billets at Air 
Stations and school instructors. 
The Marine Corps structural fire and emergency 
services consists of 16 fire departments that are 
staffed by 720 civilian fire fighters and 220 
Japanese nationals and provide fire protection to 
19 Marine Corps installations and 2 Navy 
installations. By cross training and providing 
mutual support, both F&ES departments render fire 
suppression, fire prevention, emergency medical 
response, hazardous materials response and rescue 
services to their respective areas.   
As noted in this excerpt, there is delineation within   
uniformed Marine Corps firefighters between MWSS and 
Installation manpower and organizations. This analysis is 
21 
                    
focused on the examination of installation F&ES 
organizational alternatives that fully accommodate 
expeditionary emergency service operations. Viable 
alternatives must train, educate, sustain and allow for the 
working integration of expeditionary F&ES manpower.  
In addition to the description provided by Jim Casey, 
the creation of the Chemical Biological Incident Response 
Force (CBIRF) in the spring of 1996 has provided Marine 
firefighters with an alternate mission: 
When directed, forward-deploy and/or respond to a 
credible threat of a Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, or High Yield explosive 
(CBRNE) incident in order to assist local, state, 
or federal agencies and Unified Combat Commanders 
in the conduct of consequence management 
operations by providing capabilities for agent 
detection and identification; casualty search, 
rescue, and personnel decontamination; and 
emergency medical care and stabilization of 
contaminated personnel.23
Effectiveness and Output baselines for the dual F&ES 
organizational model are developed in the next section.  
These baselines allow comparison of the alternatives 
subsequently examined.   
 
2. Effectiveness (Core Capability) Baseline  
Arguably, each Marine Corps installation has specific 
emergency service operational requirements due to variation 
in geography and operations supported. Because of this 
“uniqueness,” establishment of an F&ES Effectiveness 
Baseline that encompasses all Marine installations 
identified in the geographic scope is not practical. 
 23 CBIRF Mission, retrieved on October 13, 2005 from 
http://www.cbirf.usmc.mil/mission.htm
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However, F&ES Effectiveness Baselines for the Marine 
installations participating in this research are possible 
due to the primary research conducted at these locations.24  
To establish the Effectiveness Baseline, Camp Pendleton’s 
F&ES support requirements and department core capabilities 
are depicted in the following table.  
Although MCAS Yuma participated in the primary 
research, the joint response focus of the Yuma ARFF and SFD 
is not typical of the Marine dual F&ES structure. More 
commonly, F&ES operations by ARFF and Structural 
Departments are conducted independently and correspond 
directly to separate installation responsibilities. 
 
 Camp Pendleton F&ES 
Support Requirements   
Structural Department  
Core Competencies 














Wild Land Fire 
 
X  
Swift Water Rescue 
 
X  
Confined Space Rescue 
 
X  




Table 3 - Camp Pendleton Effectiveness Baseline 
 
In this dual F&ES organization model, Camp Pendleton’s 
F&ES needs encompass 8 total emergency service operational 
areas. Combined, the departments satisfy 100% of the 
installation’s F&ES operating requirement. Considering the 
                     24 Appendix III (Site Visits) 
23 
aggregate need (8 F&ES mission areas) for Camp Pendleton’s 
emergency services, the core capability baseline ratings 
for each department with respect to the aggregate 
installation requirement are: 
• MCAS Pendleton ARFF – 25% (2 of 8) 
• MCB Pendleton SFD – 87.5% (7 of 8) 
While this arrangement provides for total F&ES support 
to Camp Pendleton’s installation, the author poses two 
questions. 
• Does this model develop and reinforce the F&ES 
core capabilities required in the performance of 
expeditionary (deployed) emergency services by 
the ARFF Department?      
• Does this model inhibit operational effectiveness 
of mutual response by both departments to a 
common emergency? 
  
Examination of these questions is premature, as no 
alternative Effectiveness models have been detailed by the 
author for comparison.  At this point, baseline 
effectiveness for each department has been established, and 
may be used for comparison to other F&ES alternatives. Once 
again, this effectiveness baseline is not representative of 
all current Marine F&ES organizational structures, however, 
this baseline is typical.   
 
3. Output Baseline  
This measure describes the service provided and actual 
level of activity recorded or effort that was realized.  The 
level of activity measured is the labor input required to 
24 
support a given F&ES organizational arrangement, and 
correspondingly, estimated labor costs.  
Camp Pendleton’s F&ES organizational arrangement is 
stated in Tables 4 and 5. This output baseline, much as 
with the effectiveness baseline, is not comprehensive of 
all Marine Corps installation fire departments.  This 
baseline is meant to serve for representative comparison to 
alternative output baselines.  
 
Labor Source Quantity Required Description Labor Rate Total 
Military 1 Mgmt. & Admin  $   119,054   $    119,054 
Military 8 Mgmt. & Admin  $    56,626   $    453,008 
Military 1 Prevention  $    56,626   $     56,626 
Military 64 F&ES  $    56,626   $  3,624,064 
 74   Total   $  4,252,752 
 
Table 4 - Camp Pendleton ARFF Output Measures – Estimated 
Annual Labor Costs 
 
 
Labor Source Quantity Required Description Labor Rate Total 
Civil Service   1 Mgmt. & Admin  $    62,275   $     62,275 
Civil Service   7 Mgmt. & Admin  $    41,121   $    287,847 
Civil Service   7 Prevention  $    41,121   $    287,847 
Civil Service   98 F&ES  $    41,121   $  4,029,858 
 113   Total   $  4,667,827 
 
 
Table 5 - Camp Pendleton SFD Output Measures – Estimated 
Annual Labor Costs 
 
In summary, Camp Pendleton’s Output baseline of 
estimated labor costs are: 
• ARFF  $4,252,752 (Required, 74 personnel) 
• SFD   $4,667,827 (Required, 113 personnel) 
• Total $8,920,579 (Required, 187 total personnel) 
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II. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (ALTERNATIVE 2) 
1. Functional Performance Description 
The Military Department (Alternative 2) would involve 
staffing Marine Corps emergency services exclusively with 
military manpower.  
   
2. Eliminating Factors 
The author concludes that this alternative is not 
viable considering the following: 
• DoD force optimization strategic emphasis of 
reducing use of uniformed military manpower for 
support related services.25 
 
Alternative 2 may therefore be eliminated from further 
consideration.  
 
B. CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENTS (ALTERNATIVE 3) 
1. Functional Performance Description 
The Civil Service option (Alternative 3) means 
staffing Marine emergency services exclusively with civil 
service manpower. This organizational arrangement has 
proven successful for Navy installations26.  
 
2. Eliminating Factors 
Alternative 3 is not viable considering the following: 
 
 25 Appendix I (DTA force optimization emphasis) 
26 Appendix III (Lemoore Site Visit) 
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• Emergency service support requirements for Marine 
Corps contingency operations and special 
operations such CBRNE response by military 
personnel. 
 
As noted previously, and also examined in Appendix 
VII, expeditionary emergency services are integral to 
supporting forward Marine aviation operations. Thus any 
alternative that considers elimination of the F&ES military 
component is not viable. Moreover, CBRNE special operation 
missions as detailed with CBIRF previously have emerged and 
require staffing by Marine military firefighters.  
 
C. OUTSOURCED DEPARTMENTS (ALTERNATIVE 4) 
1. Functional Performance Description 
The Outsourced option (Alternative 4) involves 
staffing emergency services through the commercial sector. 
This organizational arrangement has demonstrated limited 
success for supporting emergency service operations outside 
the United States for the DoD. 
 
2. Eliminating Factors 
This alternative is not viable considering the 
following: 
• 10 U.S.C. 2465 prohibits the Department of 
Defense from contracting for emergency service 
support requirements within the continental 
United States. 
 
Appendix I details the specifics of the prohibition, 
and Appendix VII further examines the limited utility of 
contracted F&ES in contingency operations. 
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D. CONSOLIDATED DEPARTMENTS (ALTERNATIVE 5) 
1. Functional Performance Description 
The Consolidated Alternative integrates the existing 
types of labor (uniformed Marine and civil service). 
Alternative 5 is consistent with DoD/USMC force 
optimization strategy, complies with federal statute and    
provides and organizational structure capable of supporting 
installation, contingency and special operation emergency 
services for the Marine Corps. As noted in Appendix III, 
Alternative 5 serves as the F&ES alternative for Air Force 
Combat Operation Installations. 
  
2. Performance Impact and Metrics 
To examine Alternative 5 performance, effectiveness 
measures are obtained from a consolidated F&ES 
organizational model. This alternative utilizes the same 
F&ES Support Requirements identified in the Camp Pendleton 


















Wild Land Fire 
 
X 
Swift Water Rescue 
 
X 
Confined Space Rescue 
 
X 




Table 6 - Consolidated Department Effectiveness Model 
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In this consolidated F&ES organization model, the   
aggregate F&ES needs include 8 total emergency service 
operational areas. The consolidated department satisfies 
100% of the installation F&ES operating requirement (8 
support requirements, 8 core competencies).  With respect 
to the baseline effectiveness measure already established, 
the consolidated model provides for equal installation 
utility. Further comparison of the Alternatives 1 and 5 
effectiveness with regards to installation and contingency 
F&ES will be examined in subsequent discussion. 
 
3. Costs Projections 
Costs projections for Alternative 5 will also 
correspond to the Camp Pendleton required staffing for 
prevention and firefighters. As previously noted, staffing 
requirements for Fire Inspection personnel and firefighters 
are relatively static with respect to DoDI 6055.6 
requirements. However, staffing for F&ES Management and 
Administration is dependant on the size of the labor 
element managed and the number of departments a given 
installation maintains. 
Previous examination of the baseline Camp Pendleton 
Output Model identified required Fire Prevention and 
















Total F&ES & 
Prevention  
Personnel 
Required 1 64 7 98 170 
 
Table 7 - Alternative 5 Fire Prevention & F&ES Staffing 
 
The question that stands in developing Alternative 5’s 
output measure is the total staffing of management and 
administration personnel. If both departments were combined 
without reduction to either management or administrative 
staffing, the Alternative 5 department would require 17 
management and administrative personnel. 
Considering DoDI 6055.6 staffing provisions, a 
practical approach is to consider the oversight and support 
a consolidated model would realistically require from 
economical and effectiveness standpoints. To that end, the 










Figure 1.   Alternative 5 Management and Administration 
 
This model (typical of most departments) involves 
staffing for 10 management and administrative personnel. To 
alleviate some controversy over the labor mix associated 
with this staffing, the management and administrative 
billets can be divided equally between civil service and 
military personnel.  With the Alternative 5 Management and 
Administrative staffing and composition posed, a labor 








   Mgmt. & Admin. Fire Prevention F&ES Total 
1. DoDI 6055.6 
Reference  
E2.5.14.2 E2.5.14.3 E2.5.14.4   
2a. Civilian 5 7 98 110 
2b. Military 5 1 64 70 
     
     
Labor Source  Quantity Required Description Labor Rate Total 
Military 1 Mgmt. & Admin $   119,054 $    119,054 
Military 4 Mgmt. & Admin $    56,626 $    226,504 
Military 1 Prevention $    56,626 $     56,626 
Military 64 F&ES $    56,626 $  3,624,064
 70  Subtotal $  4,026,248 
     
     
Labor Source  Quantity Required Description Labor Rate Total 
Civil Service   1 Mgmt. & Admin $    62,275 $     62,275 
Civil Service   4 Mgmt. & Admin $    41,121 $    164,484 
Civil Service   7 Prevention $    41,121 $    287,847 
Civil Service   98 F&ES $    41,121 $  4,029,858
 110  Subtotal $  4,544,464 
     
   Total $  8,570,712 
 
Table 8 - Alternative 5 Output Measures – Annual Estimated 
Labor Costs 
   
4. Risk Assessment 
A risk assessment section provides an understanding of 
the risks that are related to alternatives examined. This 
section includes identification of risk (from Appendix VII) 
and mitigation strategy for each. For each risk, the 
probability of the risk occurring and the impact it may 






Probability of Risk 
• High: The event is very likely to occur 
• Medium: The event is likely to occur 
• Low: The event is not likely to occur 
 
Impact of Risk 
• High: The event has a significant impact  
• Medium: The event will impact the alternative 
• Low: The impact is relatively minor  
• None: The risk will not impact the alternative 
 
Alternative 5’s risks are examined first. The risks 
are identified in order of likelihood and impact (from most 


























 Probability Impact After Mitigation 
 
Risk 1 Description:  
 








Risk 1 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Review and determination of 
Installation Fire Chief 
position at HQMC. Subsequent 
delineation of the staffing 
decision in applicable orders 
and directives. 
 
Specific Strategy:  
 
Of all risks identified, the staffing of 
the Fire Chief position for Alternative 
5 is the most significant issue among 
civil service and military F&ES 
managers. From efficiency and command 
and control standpoints, Alternative 5 
requires one Fire Chief. Regardless of 
the outcome of this staffing decision, 
it is sure to meet organizational 
resistance. Therefore, it is recommended 
the Fire Chief staffing determination be 
reviewed and determined at HQMC, and 
promulgated through applicable orders 
and directives.  
 
 
   
 
Risk 2 Description:  
 
Possible increased F&ES 









Risk 2 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Prospective F&ES operational 
planning for anticipated 
deployments; crisis action 
planning for immediate 





Specific Strategy:  
 
The most significant operational risks 
of Alternative 5 is the deployment of 
Marine firefighters to support 
contingencies. Considering the Camp 
Pendleton Alternative 5 model, Marine 
F&ES manpower contributes 39% of the 
required department staffing. While the 
temporary reduction of military labor 
does pose an operational challenge to 
installation F&ES during deployments, 
overtime and temporary positions may be 
prospectively planned and budgeted for 
the majority of operations requiring the 
deployment of Marine Firefighters. 
Emergency situations may still occur 
that would require crisis action 
planning and budgeting. 
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 Probability Impact After Mitigation 
 
Risk 3 Description:  
 








Risk 3 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Leadership and Prospective 
Planning. 
 
Specific Strategy:  
 
Senior Marine Firefighters continue 
leadership of junior Marines by ensuring 
completion of warfighting and annual 
training (marksmanship, martial arts, 
physical fitness, etc…). Civil Service 
Management and Administration supportive 
and receptive of the military training 
requirements. Both military and civil 
service F&ES managers prospectively plan 
and execute annual training schedule for 




Risk 4 Description:  
 
Marine and Civil Service 








Risk 4 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Promulgation of F&ES 
consolidation initiative by 
HQMC via official message and 
revision to F&ES publications 
and directives. 
 
Frequent communication and 
collaboration by Marine and 
Civil Service F&ES Managers. 
 
 
Specific Strategy:  
 
Certainly friction between all 
firefighters early in consolidation will 
occur. However, as detailed in Appendix 
III with Beale AFB, consolidated 
departments are capable of functioning 
in a homogeneous manner to meet 
installation and contingency F&ES 
operations.  
 
The promulgation of a message by HQMC 
addressing Alternative 5 consolidation 
followed by revisions to Marine F&ES 
publications and directives would 
function to mandate the change 
initiative, establish consolidation 
requirements and provide legitimacy for 
the organizational change. 
    




 Probability Impact After Mitigation 
 
Risk 5 Description:  
 
Constant turnover of Marine 
firefighters requires civil 
service firefighters to 









Risk 5 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Prospective planning and 
adherence to F&ES annual 
training schedule. Surge 





Specific Strategy:  
 
While turnover of military firefighters 
may create capability deficiencies, 
Marines rarely execute unscheduled PCS 
rotations. Therefore, military rotations 
and the capability deficiencies they may 
create can be planned for by training 
non-rotating personnel for the 
anticipated deficiency. The brunt of 
such training may default to civil 
service firefighters due to their 




Risk 6 Description:  
 
Inequity of duty assignments 
for uniformed Marine 
firefighters when compared to 










Risk 6 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Collaborative management by 





Specific Strategy:  
 
Alternative 5 F&ES management should 
stress F&ES qualifications and licensing 
in workforce duty assignments rather 







 Probability Impact After Mitigation 
 
Risk 7 Description:  
 
Administration and management 
regulations for military and 
civil service personnel 
present significant cohesion 








Risk 7 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Fully integrated F&ES 
training, education and 
emergency response.  
 
Delineation of civil service 




Specific Strategy:  
 
Alternative 5 cohesion challenges will 
be normalized in time through fully 
integrated F&ES training, education and 
emergency response. 
 
Delineation of F&ES leadership duties 
should be planned and accommodated. For 
example, Marine F&ES managers administer 
proficiency and conduct evaluations, 
uniform inspections, etc… while Civil 
Service F&ES managers administer 
performance reviews, labor union 
matters, etc…  
  
 
Risk 8 Description:  
Diminished morale of work 








Risk 8 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Incorporate Tier 2 
Stakeholders in Alternative 5 
Implementation and Planning. 
 
HQMC promulgation of F&ES 
consolidation initiative by 
message.  
 
Fully integrated F&ES 




Specific Strategy:  
 
Inclusion of Tier 2 stakeholders in 
Alternative 5 planning and 
implementation would provide opportunity 
for Civil Service and Marine F&ES 
managers to contribute to the change 
process. 
 
Promulgation by HQMC will provide 
credibility and justification for the 
initiative. 
 
Acceptance of the Alternative 5 
organizational structure by the 
workforce will meet resistance. However, 
through integrated F&ES training, 
education and emergency response the 




 Probability Impact After Mitigation 
 
Risk 9 Description:  
 
Marine firefighters less 
familiar with SFD 
responsibilities, Civil 
Service firefighters less 









Risk 9 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Fully integrated F&ES 





Specific Strategy:  
 
Fully integrated F&ES training, 
education and emergency response will 
work to overcome capability deficiencies 
that may exist early in F&ES 
integration.  
 
As noted in Appendix III, the majority 
of Pendleton and Yuma firefighters 
maintain NFPA and DoD certifications in 
structural and aircraft F&ES: integrated 
training, education and response would 
further develop the core competencies 
required for the installation, and 
moreover provide Marine firefighters 
with  an enhanced F&ES core competency 
base required for contingency 
operations.     
 
 
The risks of not proceeding with Alternative 5 and 
maintaining Alternative 1 are reviewed as well, based on 















 Probability Impact After Mitigation 
 
Risk 1 Description:  
 
















Specific Strategy:  
 
Alternative 1 poses no opportunities for 
reductions in management and 




Risk 2 Description:  
 
Less capable, qualified 
Marine firefighters deployed 









Risk 2 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
F&ES Training and education 
for Marine ARFF firefighters 




Specific Strategy:  
 
F&ES Training and education for Marine 
ARFF firefighters that extends beyond 
aircraft competencies may assist Marine 
firefighters in deployed emergency 
scenarios. However, training and 
education alone do not enhance the full 
spectrum F&ES core competencies that may 



















 Probability Impact After Mitigation 
 
Risk 3 Description:  
 
Lack of flexibility and less 
F&ES capability with  










Risk 3 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Frequent cross training 
between ARFF and Structural 
Departments.  
 
Periodic joint reviews of 
mutual aid agreements. 
 
 
Specific Strategy:  
 
Frequent cross training between ARFF and 
Structural Departments is required to 
ensure effective command and control and 
response to joint F&ES emergencies. 
 
Periodic joint reviews of mutual aid 
agreements existing between ARFF and 
Structural departments will assist in 
familiarization of joint response 
requirements and operating procedures. 
 
 
Risk 4 Description:  
 
Less exposure to training and 








Risk 4 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
F&ES training and education 
for Marine ARFF firefighters 
that extends beyond aircraft 
competencies. 
 
F&ES training and education 
for civil service 
firefighters that includes 





Specific Strategy:  
 
Both structural and ARFF departments 
include training that encompasses the 
F&ES core competencies of the other. 
 
Periodic joint reviews of mutual aid 
agreements existing between ARFF and 
Structural departments. 
 
Frequent cross training and education 
between ARFF and Structural Departments 
to ensure effective command and control 











 Probability Impact After Mitigation 
 
Risk 5 Description:  
 
Outsourcing of Marine 
structural F&ES is “more 
likely” utilizing Alternative 














Specific Strategy:  
 
The continued use of Alternative 1 may 
provide for an ‘easier’ transition to 
commercial F&ES for Marine structural 
departments if 10 U.S.C. 2465 is 
canceled. 
 
The use of Alternative 5 may pose 
challenges to commercial F&ES sourcing, 
as private industry may be unwilling to 
partner F&ES responsibilities with the 
military. Alternative 5 is addressed in 
this section as this organizational 




Risk 6 Description:  
 
Less continuity for ARFF F&ES 










Risk 6 General Mitigation 
Strategy:  
 
Face-to-face turn-over for 
key management and 
administration personnel. 
 




Specific Strategy:  
 
When possible, face-to-face turn-over 
for key management and administration 
personnel should transpire to ensuring 
understanding of F&ES operations and 
response requirements. 
 
Additionally, frequent update and use of 
turnover binders may augment face-to-
face turnovers, or provide operational 
familiarity for newly assigned F&ES 
personnel in the event face-to-face 





III. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. FUNCTIONAL  
Functional comparison examines whether or not 
Alternative 5 would result in a distinctly different manner 
of providing emergency services than Alternative 1. As 
Alternative 5 poses no reduction to Fire Prevention or 
Firefighter staffing, the service functionality of 
Alternative 1 is also provided by Alternative 5. 
The functional distinction between the alternatives is 
change posed to installation/department command structures 
and relationships. Alternative 5 would provide Marine 
installation commanders with a single, multi-capable Fire, 
EMS and First Response Unit.  For Marine installations such 
as MCAS Yuma where the structural and ARFF department serve 
the same command, use of Alternative 5 is aligned with 
current command/department relationships. However, 
installations such as Camp Pendleton where structural and 
ARFF departments are responsible to separate commands, the 
use of Alternative 5 presents a significant organizational 
change. Certainly F&ES support for aviation operations need 
to remain a paramount focus when considering utilization of 
Alternative 5.  
Although substantial in impact, examination of 
functional changes posed to command/department structures 
and relationships does not provide for aggregate comparison 
of the costs and benefits associated with each 





Performance comparison is completed to provide a 
straightforward examination of performance expected from 
the remaining F&ES alternatives. Once again, the 
performance outputs that meet customer requirements 
pertaining to this business case are emergency service core 
competencies provided by each alternative. Alternative 1 
baseline effectiveness and Alternative 5 effectiveness 
measures previously identified provide the input for the 
















 X X 
Structural Fire 
Response 
X  X 
EMT/Ambulatory 
Response 
X  X 
Hazardous 
Material Response 
X X X 
Wild Land Fire 
 
X  X 
Swift Water 
Rescue 
X  X 
Confined Space 
Rescue 
X  X 
Motor Vehicle 
Accident Response 
X  X 
 
Table 9 - Installation F&ES Core Competency Comparison 
 
While the combined F&ES core competencies of 
Alternative 1 departments equal Alternative 5 for 
supporting installation F&ES requirements, another model   
detailing emergency service scenarios typical27 of 
contingency operations is provided for comparison:  
                     27 Appendix VII, ARFF Marine Interviews 
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Contingency  F&ES 
Support Requirements 
















Wild Land Fire 
 
 X 
Swift Water Rescue 
 
 X 





Table 10 - Contingency F&ES Core Competency Comparison 
 
When emergency service scenarios associated with 
contingency operations are considered, Alternative 5 
demonstrates significant F&ES core competency advantages to 
deployed Marine firefighters. Alternative 5 provides Marine 
military firefighters the opportunity to respond to 
installation F&ES scenarios outside the spectrum of service 
to aircraft, developing broadened emergency service 
expertise. Alternative 5 also may enhance unity of command 
and unity of effort toward all installation F&ES 




When considering the staffing required to support Camp 
Pendleton F&ES operations, a comparison of estimated annual 
labor costs of Alternatives 1 and 5 is provided: 











Alternative 1 Total 
Required Labor 
Spending 




$  4,667,827 $  4,252,752 $8,920,579 $  8,570,712 
 
Table 11 - Labor Costs Comparison 
 
The use of Alternative 5 estimates an annual labor 
savings of $349,867 to support Camp Pendleton F&ES 
operations. However, estimated implementation cost 
associated with this organizational change must be 
evaluated as well to obtain a net benefit evaluation of 
this organizational change.  
Alternative 5 requires an initial investment in 
personal protective equipment (PPE) for firefighters 
(structural “turnout gear” for ARFF members, and ARFF 
“proximity gear” for structural firefighters).29 The 
following provides an estimate of this PPE expense30: 
 
    ITEM QTY  U/P   T/P  
Chieftan 3200 Ultra Khaki Advanced Turnout Coat 1  $    596.00   $       596.00 
Chieftan 3200 Ultra Khaki Advanced Turnout Pants 1  $    399.00   $       399.00 
Shelby FDP Pigskin/ Gore Gloves w/ Wristlet 1  $     43.99   $        43.99 
Bullard Traditional Fire helmet w/ 4" Face Shield 1  $    184.00   $       184.00 
PGI Carbon Shield Classic Hood 1  $     27.99   $        27.99 
Ranger 16" Combat LB Rubber Boots, Insulated 1  $    147.00   $       147.00 
    $     1,397.98 
 
Table 12 - Structural PPE Cost Estimate 
 
 
                     29 DODI 6055.6 E2.5.18.2 
30 Emergency Service Personal Protective Equipment Descriptions and 
Prices, retrieved on October 13, 2005 from www.thefirestore.com
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ITEM QTY  U/P   T/P  
Fire Dex Proximity Assault Coat, Aluminized 1  $    669.99   $       669.99  
Fire Dex Proximity Assault Pants, Aluminized 1  $    599.99   $       599.99  
Bullard CX Aluminized Helmet Shell Cover 1  $     70.00   $        70.00  
Gold Hard Coated 6" Face Shield 1  $     63.00   $        63.00  
Shelby Proximity Gloves w/ Wristlet 1  $    100.99   $       100.99  
Ranger 16" ARFF Rubber Boots 1  $    133.00   $       133.00  
Flight X Black Nomex Gloves 1  $     41.99   $        41.99  
Flight X Black Nomex Hood 1  $     33.00   $        33.00  
    $     1,711.96  
 
Table 13 - ARFF PPE Costs Estimate 
 
The purchase of proximity and turnout PPE for both 
labor components to support Camp Pendleton’s Alternative 5 
implementation is estimated as detailed: 
 
F&ES Labor Component Personnel PPE Costs (1 Firefighter) Total Estimated PPE Costs
Camp Pendleton Structural Staffing 110  $              1,711.96 $             188,315.60 
Camp Pendleton ARFF Staffing 70  $              1,397.98 $              97,858.60 
   $             286,174.20 
 
Table 14 - Alternative 5 PPE Costs Estimate 
 
Training costs initially speculated with 
organizational change are negligible. Site Visits to the 
Camp Pendleton and MCAS Yuma departments (Appendix III) 
revealed the majority of ARFF and structural firefighters 
possess the requisite DoD/NFPA certifications required to 
operate as a homogeneous department.  
 In summary, the estimated labor savings weighed 
against the initial PPE costs requirement pose a net 
benefit recommendation that favors Alternative 5 in the 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ISSUES FOR 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The baseline comparisons of Alternative 1 to 
Alternative 5 suggest the use of Alternative 5 will reduce 
annual F&ES labor costs and enhance emergency service 
capability for the Marine Corps.   
The majority of the risks identified with Alternative 
5 are associated with redefined command relationships and 
organizational change dynamics. Although the identified 
risks pose challenges to installation leadership, F&ES 
managers and first responders, the risks are not associated 
with erosion of emergency service response capability. 
The gains postulated by Alternative 5 include enhanced 
emergency service core competencies for all Marine 
firefighters, an increased spectrum of F&ES capabilities 
available to Combatant Commands and small reductions to 
F&ES annual labor spending. While the postulated 
improvements are significant, realization of this 
organizational change will require reassessment of the long 
term operational strategy of emergency services in the 
Marine Corps. 
Today our forces are operating in a less predictable 
threat environment, both at home and abroad, with multiple 
axes of advance to protect against. The asymmetric threats 
of our enemies have increased the potential for 
miscalculation and surprise, principally considering 




Defense against such attacks and measures to respond to 
them require update and redefinition to bolster critical 
force protection capabilities.   
Does the current Marine F&ES alternative provide for 
synergistic response of Structural and ARFF departments to 
common emergencies? Will response to motor vehicle 
accidents, structural fires, and emergency medical service 
needs in our homeland installations by military 
firefighters better prepare them for contingency emergency 
service operations?  Does Alternative 1 support the growing 
demand for enhanced force protection measures and 
initiatives advocating optimization of installation support 
functions?  Having reviewed the costs, benefits and 
organizational dynamics associated with this change, these 
questions remain for the reader to consider.   
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The author recommends further examination of Marine 
F&ES consolidation with respect to the alignment of this 
organizational alternative with higher-level force 
optimization initiatives. Due to the unique geographic and 
operational requirements of each Marine installation, input 
from each installation identified by the geographic scope 
of this analysis should be considered in higher level 
reviews of Alternative 5. A 1997 GAO Report BASE 
OPERATIONS, Contracting for Firefighters and Security 
Guards noted: 
An A-76 study is necessary at each base that may 
convert these functions to contract because each 
base is unique in terms of the mission it must 
support and the nature of its local economy. 
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Alternative 5 is far removed from the F&ES outsourcing 
option, however, the logic advocated by GAO regarding the 
requirement to examine each installation prior to enacting 
F&ES change readily applies. 
Specific recommendations for further consideration 
include: 
• A multi-stakeholder examination of Alternative 5 
to determine operational viability and associated 
organizational change dynamics that includes: 
Ground Combat Element, Air Combat Element, Marine 
Installation, Marine Structural Firefighting, 
Aircraft Rescue Firefighting and American Federal 
Government Employee (AFGE) Firefighter Union 
representatives. 
• Solicitation of command specific input regarding 
Alternative 5 from all installations included in 
the change initiative should the multi-
stakeholder examination establish viability. 
• Consideration of an Alternative 5 “pilot program” 
at MCCDC Quantico, Virginia if the initiative is 
found viable. This location (within close 
proximity to the Marine Corps Training and 
Education Command (TECOM) and the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL)) would enable low 
cost evaluation of an ARFF/SFD integrated pilot, 
and provide for ready review  of organizational 
and operational changes associated with the 
change to promulgate to the Fleet Marine Force 
(FMF).  
 
C. ISSUES FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION 
Several issues were unable to be fully developed 
within the scope of this study. In the opinion of the 
author these topics warrant further examination to address 
substantial issues noted during the course of this 
research. The topics include:  
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• Further examination of the Enhanced Expeditionary 
Emergency Service (EEES) initiative (introduced 
in Appendix VII). 
• Development of tactical doctrine that addresses 
the use of Marine emergency service resources in 
contingency operations. This recommendation is 
based on the absence of such doctrine noted in 
review of F&ES publications and directives 
(Appendix VI). 
• Examination of replacing the AS32-P19A with a 
modern firefighting vehicle, and increased 
fielding of the Fire Suppression System (FSS) to 




















APPENDIX I. FORCE OPTIMIZATION 
A. OVERVIEW  
The modernization of the Department of Defense is 
a matter of some urgency. In fact, it could be 
said that it is a matter of life and death - 
ultimately, every American’s. A new idea ignored 
may be the next threat overlooked. A person 
employed in a redundant task is one who could be 
countering terrorism or nuclear proliferation. 
Every dollar squandered on waste is one denied to 
the warfighter. That is why we are today 
challenged bureaucracy to the battlefield, from 
the tail to the tooth. We know the adversary. We 
know the threat. And with the same firmness of 
purpose that any effort against a determined 
adversary demands, we must get at it and stay at 
it. 
 
-Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to Pentagon 
Employees, September 10, 2001 
 
 
The unfortunate irony in this quote is the date the 
Secretary of Defense delivered this speech, just one day 
prior to the terrorist attacks that forever changed America 
and our military institution. The attacks underscored the 
need for DoD to not only respond to, but preempt asymmetric 
threats to our nation. Such responsiveness will only be 
achievable through the transformation of our military and 
warfighting efforts.  
As Defense discretionary spending is subjected to 
increased levels of Congressional and service scrutiny, 
examination of measures to realize force optimization are 
prevalent. In order to meet operational requirements and 
recaptialize, implementation of force optimization 
initiatives is imperative. DoD’s top-down emphasis of force 
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optimization on the services has set a competitive agenda 
amongst armed service leadership for limited program, 
mission, and installation resource support. 
 
B. THE DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION ACT  
In April of 2003, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense on behalf of the Bush Administration proposed the 
Defense Transformation Act (DTA) to Congress. This capstone 
legislation proposed comprehensive reforms to finance, 
budgeting, and organizational management within DoD. Though 
only portions of the DTA Bill were approved by Congress, 
the measures enacted have improved the overall 
responsiveness of our military. Moreover, the DTA stressed 
a recurrent need for promoting force optimization through 
advanced technology, new operational concepts, and 
concurrent changes in organizational arrangements. 
Individual service emphasis of force optimization is 
readily evident in recently published strategy statements 
and initiatives.   
How critical is the need to promote force optimization 
in the DoD? A recently published Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) report entitled An Alternative Budget Path 
Assuming Continued Spending for Military Operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and in Support of the Global War on 




Figure 2.   CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook 
January 2005 
The scenario depicted by CBO in Figure 2: 
…assumes that military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and other activities related to the 
global war on terrorism continue at their current 
levels during 2005 and 2006, but decline after 
that. Under such assumptions, discretionary 
outlays over the 2005-2015 period would total 
$448 billion more than the baseline figures 
presented in CBO's January 2005 Budget and 
Economic Outlook. Interest costs on the 
additional debt resulting from that spending 
would amount to $173 billion over that period.  
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In estimating the spending for this scenario, CBO 
assumed that slightly more than 200,000 active 
duty and reserve personnel would be deployed to 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other overseas locations 
in 2005 and 2006, and that the number of troops 
deployed in support of the global war on 
terrorism would decline to about 50,000 by 2010 
and remain steady at that level for the remainder 
of the period. While the assumptions about 
deployed troops for 2005 and 2006 are based on 
current force levels and known DoD plans, the 
assumptions for subsequent years are hypothetical 
in nature. CBO assumed that, throughout the 10-
year period, some troops would be deployed 
overseas in operations supporting the global war 
on terrorism, but not necessarily in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
With respect to the immense spending for G.W.O.T. and 
South West Asia campaigns, measures to eliminate defense 
inefficiencies and redundancies should be examined.       
Within the four pillars of Defense Transformation, 
force optimization garnered through organizational change 








Figure 3.   Military Transformation Pillars 
 
As noted in the DoD publication Military 
Transformation, A Strategic Approach: 
Transformation of Organizations: Organizational 
change is fundamental to transformation efforts. 
We should expect organizational transformation to 
extend down through small unit levels.  
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Although this publication highlights establishment of 
U.S. Northern Command and the merging of U.S. Space and 
U.S. Strategic Command, organizational change to improve 
efficiency and enhance operations is not limited to the 
“big ticket” programs only.  Smaller programs, and even 
those contributing to force protection and first response 
such as DoD Fire and Emergency Services, are definitely 
within the scope of Transformational efficiency efforts.  
Subtitle B, Section 211 of the Defense Transformation 
Act specifically states: 
SEC. 211. CONTRACTING FOR SECURITY GUARDS AND 
FIREFIGHTING SERVICES. Section 2465 of title 10, 
United States Code, is repealed. Section-by-
Section Analysis: 
This section would allow DoD to bid and compete 
contracts for security guard services as well as 
contracts for the performance of firefighting 
functions at military installations in the 
continental United States. DoD believes such 
contracts would be more cost-effective and would 
provide DoD needed flexibility to respond more 
effectively and rapidly to contingencies and 
other exigent situations, such as the need for 
enhanced security of military installations 
following September 11th. 
Congress did not approve the Administration’s request 
to allow for the long-term contracting of DoD emergency 
services as put forth within the DTA. However, the fact 
that emergency services were identified within the DTA 
legislation as a function subject to optimization is 
notable. (It also provided impetus to conduct this specific 
analysis).   
Federal Law 10 U.S.C. 2465 mandates the prohibition of 
contracts for performance of firefighting and security 
guard functions within DoD. Published in 1983, this law 
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itself does not state the basis for the prohibition within 
the context of the document. According to the legislative 
history, the prohibition was enacted because of concerns 
about the uncertain quality and reliability of private 
firefighter and security guard services, base commanders’ 
control over contractor personnel, and the right of 
contractor personnel to strike. Under 10 U.S.C. 2465, the 
prohibition against contracting for these services does not 
apply: 
• When the contract is to be performed overseas. 
• When the contract is to be performed on 
government-owned but privately operated 
installations. 
• When the contract (or renewal of the contract) is 
for the performance of a function already under 
contract as of September 24, 1983.  
 
Although this regulation is over 20 years old, it 
stands as law, and has been amended a total of four times 
since inception, most recently in 2003 to make an allowance 
for the short term contracting of F&ES in order to support 
manpower requirements mandated by the GWOT.  
The Defense Transformation Act repeal directed at 10 
U.S.C. 2456 is comparatively a small portion of the full 
DTA document. However, the ability to maximize the number 
of uniformed personnel serving in warfighting billets as 
opposed to support functions is part of a much larger issue 
confronting the Department of Defense. Former Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz expounded on the 
aggregate picture of service and support occupations being 
outsourced by stating: 
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The inability to put civilians into hundreds of 
thousands of jobs that do not need to be 
performed by military personnel places great 
stress on the uniformed personnel and their 
availability for combat duty. Approximately 
320,000 uniformed personnel perform essentially 
nonmilitary jobs in DoD, but DoD has had to call 
up Reserve forces to serve in the war on 
terrorism. 
The renewed emphasis of contracting private sector 
capacity for nonmilitary responsibilities has also been 
championed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who 
wrote: 
Because the Pentagon lacks sufficient authority 
to manage its civilian workforce, some 200,000 
reserve troops left jobs and families to help 
fight the war on terrorism while an estimated 
300,000 active-duty military people occupy staff 
positions here at home that could be filled by 
civilians. 
DoD and corresponding subordinate Fire and Emergency 
Service directives and publications detail emergency 
service operational parameters and responsibilities; 
however, the documents do not address the specific benefits 
of retaining the emergency services within DoD. 
Additionally, service F&ES directives do not provide 
insight to the basis for armed service F&ES organizational 
structure. With insight regarding the details of retaining 
emergency services as an inherently governmental function 
and a void of information regarding the basis for 
individual armed service F&ES organizational arrangements, 
this lack of information poses challenge to DoD emergency 
services via further outsourcing considerations and 
optimization initiatives.  
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C. VISION, PRESENCE, POWER 2004 
The United States Navy’s Vision, Presence, Power 2004 
publication strongly supports force optimization 
initiatives posed by DoD’s overarching Defense 
Transformation Act. As noted in the context of the 
publication, the Navy has emphasized “organizational 
alignment” to ensure combat readiness:   
Regardless of the actual size of the Navy’s 
budget, we continue to function in a fiscally 
constrained environment—particularly as the full 
dimensions of the global war on terrorism have 
yet to be determined. Thus, we must extract the 
maximum advantage from the resources provided, 
and demand a high rate of return on our 
investments. For the Navy, “organizational 
alignment” means that our organizations, systems, 
and processes must deliver exactly what they are 
designed to produce: a combat-capable Navy ready 
to sail in harm’s way. We can do that only if all 
Navy organizations are properly aligned to 
achieve our overall objectives.  
Further, this publication illustrates the competitive 
venue Naval service programs are engaged, by stating: 
The balancing of priorities and the requisite 
resource allocation decisions comprise the key 
portion of the Navy’s PPBE process: programming 
and budgeting. The result is a program that 
allocates resources to meet the Navy’s highest 
priorities at some level of risk as the critical 
needs are funded at the expense of lower-priority 
programs. These difficult decisions are based on 
intensive analysis, informed reviews, and 
critical projections constrained by the reality 





D. CONCEPTS AND PROGRAMS 2005 
The Marine Corps’ Concepts and Programs 2005 
publication once again illuminates the competitive arena 
Marine programs and initiatives are subject to by stating: 
Economy and focus of effort are fundamental 
Marine Corps doctrines. To that end, the Marine 
Corps Business Enterprise Office has been 
established to ensure our business processes are 
providing effective support to the warfighter, 
Marines, and family members—without consuming any 
unnecessary resources. 
In the Marine Corps, “business transformation” 
means changing the culture, business practices, 
processes, and organizations for a sustained 
warfighting advantage. 
Our purpose is to become the most effective and 
efficient Marine Corps possible, optimizing 
resources at every level of command in order to 
free resources for investment in core combat 
capabilities. 
Business Enterprise crosses all organizational 
boundaries and includes all resources, processes, 
and products and services that support the 
warfighter. We are aggressively pursuing business 
initiatives to drive innovation and change, 
initiating end-to-end process improvements, and 
developing the business skills and capabilities 
of our Marines and civilian Marines to accomplish 
our objectives. Our end-to-end business process 
assessments will result in improved effectiveness 
and efficiencies through regionalization, 
competitive sourcing, process reengineering, 
divestiture, or elimination of non-core 
functions. 
 
E. WHITE LETTER 06-04 
The Commandant of the Marine Corp’s White Letter 
Transforming Our Business Processes charges Marine  
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leadership to support the optimization efforts of Defense 
Transformation. As noted within the context of the 
document: 
As we transform our business processes, we must 
keep resources and leadership energy focused on 
combat capabilities. Necessary, but secondary 
efforts must be accomplished with the minimum 
resources possible. Unnecessary efforts that 
compete with our warfighting priorities will not 
continue to be resourced. 
The campaign to improve the way we manage the 
business of our Corps will be among the most 
important initiatives that will ensure MAGTF 
relevance in 2015. It will not be quick, easy, 
comfortable or without risks.  
F. SUMMARY 
Achieving force optimization will meet many 
challenges.  Unlike the private sector, where the functions 
of a firm are readily measured by profit or loss, National 
Defense “products” are not so easily measured. Defense 
programs ultimately function to achieve readiness, which is 
secured through allocating resources (chiefly manpower, 
fiscal allocations, and equipment). As the resources 
available to the services to support required missions are 
subjected to increasing scrutiny, program structures will 
continue to be analyzed to ensure optimal resource use. 
Although functional optimization may serve a greater good, 
careful examination of force optimization initiatives is 
most prudent prior to enacting organizational changes, 
especially when the services examined are as critical as 




APPENDIX II. ARMED SERVICE F&ES REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
In August of 2003 the DoD Inspector General published 
DOD Fire and Emergency Services Program (D-2003-121). The 
report examined the adequacy and effectiveness of DoD F&ES 
with the noted results: 
Additional missions, increased deployments, 
National Guard and Reserve mobilizations, and 
inefficient hiring processes have adversely 
affected fire department staffing. As a result, 
firefighters have worked significant overtime, 
which may impact the fire department’s ability to 
accomplish its missions and lead to potential 
safety risks for firefighters. The Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment) with the DoD Components, should 
jointly update and implement DoD Instruction 
6055.6 so that the instruction addresses 
anticipated staffing for additional missions; 
should establish a manpower standard that 
incorporates each mission assigned to the fire 
and emergency services program; and should 
establish and publish a detailed human capital 
strategic plan. 
The Inspector General notes concern with F&ES 
operational staffing. This concern further substantiates 
the need for emergency service optimization. This appendix 
examines the following F&ES directives to identify 
operational staffing requirements and optimization 
requirements:  
• DoDI 6055.6 (DoD Fire and Emergency Services 
Program 
• OPNAVINST 1320.23F CH 2 (Shore Activities Fire 
and Emergency Services Program) 
• NAVAIR 00 80R-14 (NATOPS U.S. Navy Aircraft 
Firefighting and Rescue Manual) 
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• MCO P11000.11B (Marine Corps Fire Protection and 
Emergency Services Program) 
• AFI 3200-2001 (The Fire Protection Operations and 
Fire Prevention Program) 
 
B. DODI 6055.6 
The DoD Fire and Emergency Services Program details 
performance oriented, overarching emergency service 
operating requirements for all DoD components. The 
instruction identifies emergency response in a broad 
manner:  
E2.5.2. Emergency Response. Fire departments 
shall be prepared, by virtue of appropriate 
training and equipment, to respond (both on and 
off the installation) to emergencies involving 
facilities, structures, aircraft, transportation 
equipment, hazardous materials, and both natural 
and man-made disasters (including acts of 
terrorism). Procedures shall be implemented in 
accordance with nationally recognized standards 
and integrated emergency management systems to 
prevent loss of life, injury, and property 
damage; to maintain security; and to minimize 
public inconvenience. 
In general, all DoD components are responsible to 
support (as applicable) structural fire response, aircraft 
rescue, hazardous materials emergency response, emergency 
medical and rescue, wild land fire response, fire 
prevention and fire education. 
Appendix IV provides a detailed overview of DoDI 
6055.6 staffing requirements. The instruction extends 
latitude to DoD components to determine F&ES organizational 
structure and labor composition (with the exception of 
outsourcing). It also permits cross-staffing, requires  
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cross-training, and requires F&ES optimization efforts and 
continual improvement of emergency service quality and 
performance as noted: 
E2.5.15. Cross-Staffing. Components may cross-
staff F&ES apparatus where structural, ARFF, and 
specialized apparatus are assigned to the same 
fire station. Cross-staffing shall not diminish 
minimum staffing requirements of enclosure 5. 
E2.5.17.7. Cross-Training. Structural and ARFF 
fire departments shall be equipped and F&ES 
personnel assigned shall be cross-trained to be 
mutually supporting. 
E2.5.20. Consolidation of Fire Departments. To 
minimize the impact of personnel costs and to 
eliminate duplicate F&ES, the DoD Components 
shall continue the ongoing efforts to consolidate 
fire departments. 
E2.5.23.3. Continually improve quality and 
performance and determines if programs and 
services are effective in meeting the needs of 
the DoD Component. 
C. OPNAVINST 1320.23F CH 2 
The Navy’s primary F&ES directive supports DoDI 6055.6 
operating and staffing requirements: further, the 
instruction amplifies F&ES core functions and staffing 
standards: 
1-2. Objectives. The Navy Fire Protection and 
Emergency Service Program’s fundamental 
objectives are to prevent loss of life, injury to 
personnel, and damage to Government property 
resulting from fires and other emergencies and to 
provide cost-effective fire prevention, fire 
protection engineering, and emergency response 
services. 
f. Fire Department. Navy fire departments shall 
be organized in accordance with NFPA 1201, 
"Recommendations for Developing Fire Protection 
Services for the Public", reference (b), and 
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staffed and equipped to meet the F&ES standards 
outlined in this instruction. Fire departments 
provide service to the installation and to the 
surrounding jurisdictions through mutual or 
automatic aid agreements. Core functions fire 
departments perform include: fire suppression, 
fire prevention, public fire safety education, 
fire service training, hazardous materials 
emergency response, rescue, and emergency 
response to natural and man-made disasters. Fire 
department personnel shall be properly trained 
and become certified in per reference (d). 
2-6. Fire Department Staffing. Staffing standards 
for management and administration, fire 
prevention, and emergency response personnel are 
established in reference (a). Emergency response 
staffing standards are based on full-time career 
personnel working 72 hours per week on 24-hour 
shifts. The number of emergency response 
personnel authorized in each fire department is 
based on the number and types of emergency 
vehicles needed to meet fire flow and travel time 
standards. Intermittent emergency response 
personnel programs may be established to provide 
staffing and leave management. The number of fire 
prevention personnel authorized is based on an 
installation’s size. The administrative and 
management authorizations are based on the Fire 
Department’s size. On a case-by-case basis, CNI 
may approve cross staffing of aircraft rescue and 
fire fighting and other specialized vehicles from 
structural or Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting 
vehicles. 
This Naval directive mandates consolidation of 
departments within close operational proximity, and 
encourages the use of F&ES mutual aid: 
2-11. Fire Department Consolidation and 
Regionalization. Where two or more shore 
activities are contiguous or in close proximity, 
or within a 50-mile radius, individual fire 
departments shall be consolidated under the 
administrative and operational control of a 
single command. Regional fire department 
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functions, for departments outside the 50-mile 
radius, can be consolidated if at least one of 
the following can be achieved, and the senior 
fire employee retains a reporting relationship 
with the installation CO: 
a. Routine emergency response of fire and 
emergency services apparatus between activities 
b. Significant cost savings documented by an in-
depth cost analysis 
c. A more efficient or effective organization, 
increased production or level of protection, but 
without an increase in resources. 
d. Where consolidation is impractical, 
administrative and resource support functions 
such as budget, payroll, personnel, and central 
procurement of personal protective clothing, 
equipment, tools, appliances, and fire apparatus 
should be regionalized. Where two or more 
government activities are in close proximity, 
consolidation via inter-agency agreement shall be 
pursued if items a, b, or c above can be 
affected. CNI shall review fire department 
consolidation and regionalization plans prior to 
implementation to ensure compliance with 
appropriate public laws and DoD regulations. 
2-16. Mutual and Automatic Aid Agreements. Fire 
Departments are encouraged to enter into mutual 
and automatic aid agreements with surrounding 
jurisdictions when it is in both parties' best 
interests. In the absence of formal mutual or 
automatic aid agreements, installation COs may 
give emergency assistance when such assistance is 
deemed to be in the best interest of the United 
States and the Navy. Regional and installation 
Fire Chiefs serve as the technical authority on 
mutual aid agreements and provide technical 
assistance to installation commanders. 
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D. NAVAIR 00 80R-14  
The NATOPS U.S. Navy Aircraft Firefighting and Rescue 
Manual supports DoDI 6055.6 operational and staffing 
mandates.  This directive is focused on the technical 
aspects of aviation related F&ES for the Navy and Marine 
Corps. This manual: 
…standardizes Aircraft Firefighting and Rescue 
Procedures. Compliance with the stipulated manual 
requirements and procedures is mandatory except 
as authorized herein. In order to remain 
effective, NATOPS must be dynamic and stimulate 
rather than suppress individual thinking. Since 
aviation fire suppression and protection is a 
continuing, progressive profession, it is both 
desirable and necessary that new ideas and new 
techniques be expeditiously evaluated and 
incorporated if proven to be sound. To this end, 
commanding officers of aviation units are 
authorized to modify procedures contained here, 
in accordance with the waiver provisions 
established by OPNAVINST 3710.7 series, for the 
purpose of assessing new ideas prior to 
initiating recommendations for permanent changes. 
This manual is prepared and kept current by the 
users in order to achieve maximum readiness and 
safety in the most efficient and economical 
manner. Should conflict exist between the 
training and operating procedures found in this 
manual and those found in other publications, 
this manual will govern. 
The NAVAIR advocates dynamic and individual thinking 
to develop desirable and necessary F&ES changes. However, 
the manual clearly delineates separate aviation and 
structural fire departments within the Marine Corps, 
inhibiting reflection on organizational alternatives for 
supporting Marine F&ES:   
The two principal fire protection functions at 
aviation shore activities are aircraft rescue and 
firefighting protection and structural fire 
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protection. These services shall be organized and 
consolidated in accordance with OPNAVINST 
11320.23 series. 
At Marine Corps air stations, the aircraft rescue 
and firefighting protection and the structural 
fire protection are two separate, mutually 
supporting organizations. In accordance with 
Marine Corps Order P5320.5 and P11000.11 series, 
the aircraft rescue and firefighting branch is 
under the operational and administrative control 
of the airfield operations officer; the 
structural fire department, however, is part of 
the station facilities organization and under 
their administrative control. Marine Corps 
structural fire departments are under the control 
of the station fire chief. When the structural 
fire department is in support of the aircraft 
rescue and firefighting branch, it is then under 
the operational control of the ARFF officer. The 
aircraft rescue and firefighting branch and the 
structural fire department shall be cross-trained 
and mutually supporting.  
The station fire chief and/or ARFF officer shall 
be responsible for the operational readiness, 
performance, technical training, and management 
of their respective fire protection 
organizations. The fire chief/ARFF officer or his 
designated representative shall have control and 
direct supervision of all firefighting and rescue 
operations at the immediate scene of an aircraft 
emergency and shall be so designated in writing. 
The air operations officer or, in his absence, a 
designated assistant exercises overall control of 
the airfield other than at the immediate scene of 
an accident.  
The combined fire functions will require that 
civilian and military personnel assigned to the 
fire protection organization be appropriately 
trained in both structural and aircraft fire and 
rescue procedures. Civilian position descriptions 
will embrace all duties and responsibilities 
associated with aircraft and structural 
firefighting. The position title is “firefighter” 
in lieu of the titles “firefighter, structural” 
or “ firefighter, airfield.” Aircraft Rescue and 
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Firefighting (ARFF) is the approved global name 
for all U.S. Navy and MCAS fire protection 
functions at aviation shore activities. 
E. MCO P11000.11B  
The Marine Corps’ Fire Protection and Emergency 
Services Program supports the staffing and operational 
requirements of DoDI 6055.6. The order begins by stressing 
cost-effective use of fire protection resources; however it 
makes no delineation in the separation between structural 
and aviation departments. The order advocates functional 
optimization through outside assistance and mutual aid 
agreements, and further requires department consolidations 
that do not impair mission requirements: 
2004. OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. The number of emergency 
response personnel and equipment needed at any 
installation depends on the availability of 
outside forces. Credit for outside forces shall 
be permitted on a company by company basis when 
the outside forces conforms favorably to the 
standards prescribed in this Manual. For Class A 
installations, outside forces should not exceed 
one-half of the total company requirements unless 
the activity is located within or adjacent to a 
large municipality. 
2010. FIRE DEPARTMENT CONSOLIDATIONS. Fire 
department functions at military installations in 
a regional geographic area shall be consolidated 
where such action is cost-effective, reduces 
inefficiencies and duplication and will not 
impair mission requirements. 
2015. MUTUAL AND AUTOMATIC AID AGREEMENTS. Fire 
departments are encouraged to enter into mutual 
and automatic aid agreements with surrounding 
jurisdictions where it is in the best interest of 
both parties. In the absence of formal mutual or 
automatic aid agreements, installation commanders 
may give emergency assistance when such interest 
is deemed to be in the best interest of the 
United States and the Marine Corps.  
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F. AFI 3200-2001  
The Fire Protection Operations and Fire Prevention 
Program is the Air Force’s primary F&ES directive, 
requiring compliance with DoDI 6055.6 operating and 
staffing requirements. The instruction does not make 
specific reference to F&ES optimization initiatives. 
However, it provides direction for staffing reductions, and 
the use of Memorandum of Agreements and Mutual Aid 
Agreements to offset internal levels of fire protection 
staffing and equipage. 
3.1.2.1. Staffing Reduction. Installation 
commanders have the authority to reduce levels of 
aircraft rescue and fire fighting capabilities 
during periods when the flight control tower is 
not operational due to non-flying, and combined 
with no aircraft ground servicing or maintenance. 
Staffing will not be reduced below the level 
required to meet regulatory requirements for 
structural fire fighting and hazardous material 
incidents. This includes ensuring sufficient 
staffing is on hand to respond the minimum 
required aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF) 
vehicles to initiate fire suppression actions and 
provide fire fighting agent and water resupply. 
3.1.2.2. Memorandum of Agreement. Commanders may 
establish a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with 
civilian communities or other government agencies 
to offset internal levels of fire protection 
staffing and equipage. MOAs of this type must be 
coordinated with the major command civil engineer 
and comply with AFI 10-802, Military Support to 
Civil Authorities. 
3.1.7. Mutual Aid Agreements. The fire chief 
manages Mutual Aid Agreements in accordance with 
Attachment 4 (US) and Attachment 5 (Foreign) of 
this AFI. If the Air Force provides fire fighting 
services at joint-use civilian airports, include 
a release and indemnification clause in 
accordance with Attachment 6 of this AFI. Mutual 
aid agreements, and emergency responses to local 
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communities not covered by mutual aid agreements, 
must be approved by the installation commander. 
3.1.7.1. Fire chiefs and their assistants must 
coordinate with local agencies to familiarize 
each other with the incident management system 
used by each emergency response agency and the 
level at which these agencies comply with NFPA 
1500, Fire Department Occupational Safety and 
Health Program, operational safety requirements. 
It is critical that off-base agencies be aware of 
NFPA 1500 requirements and the Air Force 
requirement to appoint a fire ground safety 
officer at any incident if one has not been 
appointed. 
3.1.7.2. Off-Base Surveys. Installation fire 
departments annually survey those areas 
surrounding the base where they may be called 
upon to provide mutual aid or assistance to 
ensure a full understanding of potential hazards. 
The installation fire department will obtain 
copies of civilian fire department emergency 
response plans for high hazard areas where they 
may be requested to provide assistance. 
G. SUMMARY  
The service F&ES directives examined stipulate 
compliance with DoDI 6055.6 staffing and operational 
requirements, and stress the use of mutual aid to provide 
synergistic employment of F&ES resources.  Interestingly, 
only Navy and Marine publications examined detail F&ES 
optimization requirements (OPNAVINST 1320.23F CH 2 and MCO 
P11000.11B). 
Another commonality noted is a lack of specific 
reference to emergency services as an inherently 
governmental function.  While DoDI 6055.6 identifies the 
F&ES outsourcing prohibition, the absence of narrative 
regarding this position arguably does little to support 
current F&ES arrangements of the armed services. 
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Additionally, none of the armed service directives 
examined detail the basis for their respective F&ES 
organizational structures.  While this omission possibly 
provides flexibility to structure F&ES organizational 
alternatives, it also does little to demonstrate the 
utility, effectiveness or operational need of 
organizational alternatives employed by each service.  
Considering ongoing Defense transformation 
initiatives, specifying DoD emergency services as an 
inherently governmental function in revisions of DoDI 6055 
series will provide the armed services with future 
continuity for respective F&ES organizational arrangements. 
Likewise, the inclusion of narrative explaining the 
utility, effectiveness and operational need of specific 
organizational F&ES alternatives in subsequent revisions of 
armed service F&ES directives will promote the longevity of 
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APPENDIX III. SITE VISITS 
A. OVERVIEW 
An examination of specific Marine, Navy and Air Force 
installation emergency services was completed by site 
visits to: 
• MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton (May 2005) 
• Marine Corps Air Station Yuma (May 2005) 
• Beale Air Force Base (July 2005) 
• Naval Air Station Lemoore (July 2005) 
 
Data collection methods included e-mail and telephonic 
interviews with Fire Chiefs and Officers-in-Charge prior to 
the conduct of each visit, followed by on-site interviews 
with installation emergency service key management 
personnel and firefighters to document the following with 
respect to each installation and corresponding 
department(s) visited: 
• Installation Description 
• F&ES Organizational Structure/Mission 
• Jurisdiction 
• Training Emphasis 
• Manpower 
• Department Input 
The information pertaining to each Site Visit 
completed was submitted as a draft for respective 
Department Officers-in-Charge and Fire Chiefs review to 
ensure accuracy. Also warranting mention is the rotation of 
the Camp Pendleton and Yuma ARFF OIC’s during this 
analysis; WO-2 Hilliard replaced by WO Tarker, and CWO-4 
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Bond by CWO-3 Lopez. Both replacements occurred due to 
normal Permanent Change of Station (PCS) rotations.   
 
B. CAMP PENDLETON 
1. Installation Description  
Camp Pendleton is committed to operating and 
maintaining the world’s finest amphibious 
training facility. With more than 125,000 acres 
of varied terrain and 17.1 more miles of 
shoreline, Camp Pendleton is one of the 
Department of Defense’s busiest training 
installations.  
The base’s varied topography, combined with its 
amphibious training areas, inland training ranges 
and airspace, offers maximum flexibility for 
Marine Air Ground Task Forces and other service 
units that require a realistic combat training 
environment. Each year more than 40,000 active-
duty and 26,000 reserve military personnel from 
all services use Camp Pendleton’s many ranges and 
training facilities to maintain and sharpen their 
combat skills.  
Each day and night, thousands of Marines, 
soldiers, sailors and airmen hone their skills 
from the sea, on land and in the air above the 
Marine Corps’ premiere amphibious training base. 
Camp Pendleton is home to the I Marine 
Expeditionary Force and two of its major 
subordinate commands – the 1st Marine Division 
and 1st Force Service Support Group. This finely 
tuned fighting force is the principal user of the 
base’s training facilities.  
Camp Pendleton offers a wide array of training 
opportunities: firing ranges for everything from 
9 mm pistols to 155 mm artillery; landing 
beaches; parachute drop zones; aircraft bombing  
and strafing ranges; three mock urban warfare 
towns; and large maneuver areas for training 
tactical units. 31
 31 Camp Pendleton Installation Description, retrieved October 13, 
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2. Organizational Structure/Mission 
Emergency service response aboard Camp Pendleton is 
supported by two fire departments: the Marine Corps Base 
(MCB) Pendleton Structural Fire Department (SFD) and the 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Pendleton Aircraft Rescue 
Fire Fighting (ARFF). In general, the ARFF department 
provides for primary emergency response required for 
aircraft related emergencies both on and off the Air 
Station, while the structural department is responsible for 
all non-aircraft emergencies aboard Camp Pendleton. An 
overview of each department’s emergency service core 
competencies (based on input from department managers) is 
provided. 
 
 Primary Mission/Core 
Competencies 













Wild Land Fire  X  
Swift Water Rescue X  
Confined Space Rescue X  




Table 15 - Camp Pendleton F&ES Core Competencies 
 
3. Jurisdiction 
The Pendleton SFD and ARFF departments maintain a 
Mutual Aid Agreement that enables the other to request and 
receive emergency service augmentation however as noted in 




the mission comparison, the departments are specialized in 
their respective core capabilities and mission 
responsibilities. 
The MCB Pendleton SFD provides response to all of Camp 
Pendleton (less the air facility unless requested via 
mutual aid) and municipal areas and regions that border the 
base via pre-established Mutual Aid agreements with Los 
Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside, and North 
Counties.  The SFD serves a daytime Camp population in 
excess of 90,000 personnel.  
The MCAS ARFF supports over 180 helicopters assigned 
to Marine Air Groups 39 and 46 Detachment A and a wide 
variety of other Marine Corps units and visiting aircraft 
from other branches of the Armed Forces and U.S. coalition 
partners.  
 
4. Training Emphasis 
Both departments usually conduct F&ES training 
independently. Camp Pendleton’s SFD training ensures 
response to the primary mission responsibilities noted, and 
specifically emphasizes Hazardous Material Training using 
their own certified instructors and the Virginia Department 
of Fires Program.32 Additionally the SFD’s Emergency Medical 
Service Training is supported through the State of 
California. Camp Pendleton ARFF partners with Texas A&M 
University and their Emergency Service Training Institute 
to provide multidimensional firefighting, emergency medical 
service, and hazardous material training for their ARFF 
personnel. 
                     32 Virginia Department of Fires Program, retrieved October 13, 2005 
from http://www.vdfp.state.va.us/
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Each department trains to the mission requirements of 
the other. As noted below, many of the Pendleton SFD 
Firefighters maintain DoD/NFPA certification as Aircraft 
Firefighters, and ARFF Marines hold structural firefighting 
certifications. 
 









100 100 (100%) 82 (82%) 
Pendleton 
ARFF33
43 41 (95%) 43 (100%) 
 
Table 16 - Camp Pendleton F&ES Certifications 
 
Both departments can cross-staff (temporarily assign 
manpower to the other department for training/experience 
benefit). However, cross-staffing does not occur, 
especially since the beginning of the G.W.O.T., which has 
“sapped Marine ARFF manpower to support deployed emergency 
service requirements” as noted by WO-2 Hilliard, the 
Pendleton ARFF Officer-in-Charge.  
 
5. Manpower 
An aggregate overview of both the Pendleton ARFF and 
SFD manpower is provided: 
                     33 Total includes Management and Administration Staffing 
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1. DoDI 6055.6 
Reference Paragraph 
E2.5.14.2 E2.5.14.3 E2.5.14.4  
2. Required Personnel 
per Reference 
9 1 64 74 
2a. Civilian 0 0 0 0 
2b. Military 5 0 38 43 
2c. Total (2a + 2b) 5 0 38 43 
3. Difference (2-2c) -4 -1 -26 -31 
4. Reason for 
Shortfall 
    
4a. Deployment 3 1 28 32 
4b. Sickness or 
Disability 
0 0 0 0 
4c. Open Vacancy 0 0 0 0 
4d. Reserve 
Mobilization 
0 0 0 0 
4e. Unfunded Position  0 0 6 6 
4f. Other 1 0 0 1 
5. Action to Address 
Shortfall 
    
5a. Fill Action 
Initiated 
0 0 18 18 
5b. Reserve Backfill 0 0 13 13 
5c. Temp Position 0 0 0 0 
5d. Waiver 0 0 0 0 
5e. Other 0 0 0 0 
 


























1. DoDI 6055.6 
Reference Paragraph 
E2.5.14.2 E2.5.14.3 E2.5.14.4  
2. Required Personnel 
per Reference 
8 7 98 113 
2a. Civilian 9 4 100 113 
2b. Military 0 0 0 0 
2c. Total ( 2a + 2b) 9 4 100 113 
3. Difference ( 2- 2c) +1 -3 +2 0 
4. Reason for 
Shortfall 
    
4a. Deployment 0 0 0 0 
4b. Sickness or 
Disability 
0 0 2 2 
4c. Open Vacancy 0 0 0 0 
4d. Reserve 
Mobilization 
0 0 2 2 
4e. Unfunded Position  0 1 0 1 
4f. Other 0 0 0 0 
5. Action to Address 
Shortfall 
    
5a. Fill Action 
Initiated 
0 2 8 10 
5b. Reserve Backfill 0 0 0 0 
5c. Temp Position 0 0 0 0 
5d. Waiver 0 0 0 0 
5e. Other 0 1 0 1 
 
Table 18 - MCB Pendleton SFD Manpower 
 
6. Department Input 
Both the SFD Chief (Mr. Tim Hoover) and the ARFF OIC 
(WO-2 Andrew Hilliard) stated that Pendleton’s current 
emergency service organizational structure provides maximum 
flexibility and response to the Commander, MCB Pendleton 
and the Commander, MCAS Pendleton respectively. From a 
multiple command perspective, emergency service focus of 
each command differs, thus the dual emergency structure 
reflects the responsiveness to the responsibilities of each 
Commander. Both the SFD and ARFF members interviewed stated 
their installation emergency services as specialized to 
meet differing specific command needs, not redundant or 
duplicative.  
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C. MCAS YUMA 
1. Installation Description  
MCAS Yuma is the busiest air station in the 
Marine Corps and the third busiest in the Naval 
service. It is also one of the largest single 
contributors to the economy of Yuma County. Its 
primary mission is to support aerial weapons 
training for the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet 
Marine Forces and Navy, and to serve as a base of 
operations for Marine Aviation Weapons and 
Tactics Squadron-1, and Third MAW units, to 
include Marine Aircraft Group-13. Yuma 
International Airport (YUM) is a commercial 
service airport at a shared-use airfield with 
Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma. YUM is owned by 
the County of Yuma, and operated by the Yuma 
County Airport Authority, Inc. (YCAA).  
As the scheduling authority for the Yuma Training 
Range Complex, MCAS Yuma provides fleet squadrons 
access to 10,000 square miles of special-use 
airspace designated for military aviation 
training and almost 2,000 square miles of 
underlying land reserved as aerial bombing and 
gunnery ranges. Collectively, this complex is the 
largest tactical aviation training range utilized 
by the Marine Corps. Each year, approximately 50 
aviation units deploy here to train on Yuma's 2.8 
million-acre range complex. These deployments, 
ranging from a few days to weeks, bring 13,000 
personnel and 1,000 aircraft to Yuma annually. In 
addition, MCAS is the only joint-use air station 
in the Marine Corps. Through an agreement between 
the Marine Corps and Yuma County, MCAS provides 
all air traffic control, crash crew services, 
security, and maintains the runways and taxiways 
for both MCAS and Yuma International Airport.34
 
2. Organizational Structure/Missions 
MCAS Yuma’s emergency services compare in 
organizational structure (separate SFD/ARFF) with that 
                     34 MCAS Yuma installation Description, retrieved October 13, 2005 
from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/yuma.htm
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examined at Camp Pendleton, however the Yuma emergency 
services differed considerably from Pendleton in the scope 
of emergency response; both departments respond mutually to  
“all” emergencies, whether they are structural or aircraft 
related (SFD units stand-by in the event of aircraft 
emergencies; ARFF units only respond to non-ARFF 
emergencies if manning and equipment in excess of DoDI 
6055.6 requirements for the airfield operations are 
available). 
As with the Camp Pendleton Site Visit, a review of 
each department’s emergency service core competencies (from 


















Wild Land Fire  X X 
Confined Space Rescue X X 




Table 19 - MCAS Yuma F&ES Core Competencies 
 
3. Jurisdiction 
Both departments maintain joint full-spectrum 
emergency service jurisdiction aboard the air station, 
within designated areas adjacent the air station through 
mutual aid agreement with the City of Yuma, and are 
responsible to respond to aircraft emergencies occurring 
within 15 nautical miles of MCAS Yuma. 
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4. Training Emphasis 
Although the Yuma departments do not cross-staff, 
well-rounded practical experience that transcends classroom 
training/certification and planned exercises/drills is 
gained by all Yuma firefighters through the emphasis of 
joint response to a wide-array of actual emergency 
situations. 
Through partnership with Arizona Western Community 
College, the MCAS Yuma ARFF provides for a broad spectrum 
of F&ES, Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) and Hazardous 
Material training to Yuma’s military and civil service 
firefighters alike.   
In addition to formal classroom environment training, 
Yuma’s ARFF Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT’s) are sent 
for “ride-along time” with commercial sector paramedics 
serving the City of Yuma and the MCAS Yuma Fire Department. 
Additionally, ARFF EMT’s also receive “clinical time” in 
the Emergency Room of Yuma Regional Medical Center and 
Installation Branch Medical Clinic whenever possible to 
provide practical, hands-on EMT training for uniformed 
Marine firefighters.  
As was noted during the Pendleton Site Visit, each 
Yuma department trains to the mission responsibilities of 
the other. However, Yuma’s classroom training reinforces 
skills that are required to sustain the performance of 
jointly executed full spectrum F&ES response. 
 








Yuma SFD 31 31 (100%) 29 (94%) 
Yuma ARFF 53 53 (100%) 53 (100%) 
 
Table 20 - MCAS Yuma F&ES Certifications 
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5. Manpower 
An aggregate overview of both the Yuma ARFF and SFD 
manpower is provided: 
 





1. DoDI 6055.6 
Reference Paragraph 
E2.5.14.2 E2.5.14.3 E2.5.14.4  
2. Required Personnel 
per Reference 
13 1 99 113 
2a. Civilian 0 0 0 0 
2b. Military 3 1 53 57 
2c. Total (2a + 2b) 3 1 53 57 
3. Difference (2 – 2c) -10 0 -46 -56 
4. Reason for 
Shortfall 
    
4a. Deployment 0 0 41 41 
4b. Sickness or 
Disability 
0 0 7 7 
4c. Open Vacancy 0 0 0 0 
4d. Reserve 
Mobilization 
0 0 0 0 
4e. Unfunded Position  0 0 0 0 
4f. Other 0 0 0 0 
5. Action to Address 
Shortfall 
    
5a. Fill Action 
Initiated 
0 0 0 0 
5b. Reserve Backfill 0 0 0 0 
5c. Temp Position 0 0 0 0 
5d. Waiver 0 0 0 0 
5e. Other 0 0 0 0 
 












1. DoDI 6055.6 
Reference Paragraph 
E2.5.14.2 E2.5.14.3 E2.5.14.4  
2. Required Personnel 
per Reference 
5 4 33 42 
2a. Civilian 4 4 31 39 
2b. Military 0 0 0 0 
2c. Total (2a + 2b) 4 4 31 39 
3. Difference (2 – 2c) -1 0 -2 -3 
4. Reason for 
Shortfall 
    
4a. Deployment 0 0 0 0 
4b. Sickness or 
Disability 
0 0 0 0 
4c. Open Vacancy 0 0 0 0 
4d. Reserve 
Mobilization 
0 0 0 0 
4e. Unfunded Position  1 0 2 3 
4f. Other 0 0 0 0 
5. Action to Address 
Shortfall 
    
5a. Fill Action 
Initiated 
0 0 0 0 
5b. Reserve Backfill 0 0 0 0 
5c. Temp Position 0 0 2 2 
5d. Waiver 0 0 0 0 
5e. Other 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 22 - MCAS Yuma SFD Manpower 
 
6. Department Input 
Chief Bailey (MCAS Yuma SFD Chief) and CWO-4 Roger 
Bond (MCAS Yuma ARFF OIC) attributed their joint response 
emphasis to the needs of the Yuma Command and their working 
relations, which more likely than not, are impacted by the 
physical location of both departments - the same facility. 
The co-location of both departments enables the sharing of 
F&ES resources, promotes cross-training and enhances 
opportunities for emergency service education. The co-
location of the departments is possible due to the small 
size of the Yuma installation proper. (On Camp Pendleton, 
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multiple satellite departments are required in order to 
meet established NFPA and DoD specified response times).  
 
D. BEALE AIR FORCE BASE 
1. Installation Description 
The 9th Reconnaissance Wing is responsible for 
providing national and theater command 
authorities with timely, reliable, high-quality, 
high-altitude reconnaissance products. To 
accomplish this mission, the wing is equipped 
with the nation's fleet of U-2 reconnaissance 
aircraft and associated support equipment. The 
wing also maintains a high state of readiness in 
its combat support and combat service support 
forces for potential deployment in response to 
theater contingencies. The 9th Reconnaissance 
Wing is composed of more than 3,000 personnel in 
four groups at Beale and multiple overseas 
operating locations.35
 
2. Organizational Structure/Missions 
The Beale Air Force Base Fire Department provides full 
spectrum emergency services to the installation. This 
department’s organizational structure is comprised of both 
Civil Service and uniformed Airmen operating jointly within 
the same department.  
An overview of the Beale Fire Department emergency 
service core capabilities (input from key department 
personnel) is provided for review. 
                     35 Retrieved October 13, 2005 from http://www.beale.af.mil/9RW/mission.asp
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Primary Mission/Core Competencies Beale AFB Fire Department 
Air Emergency Response X 
Structural Fire Response X 
EMT Response (Basic) X 
Hazardous Material Response X 
Wild Land Fire  X 
Confined Space Rescue X 
Motor Vehicle Accident Response X 
 
Table 23 - Beale AFB F&ES Core Competencies 
 
3. Jurisdiction 
The Beale department has primary jurisdiction for 
Beale Air Force Base collectively, and may respond (or 
receive assistance) through mutual aid agreements with 12 
local civil departments that include Wheatland, Marysville, 
Yuba City, Linda, OliveHurst and Plumas Brophy. The Beale 
Fire Department also provides for primary emergency 
response to several rural routes and highways that buttress 
the base. 
 
4. Training Emphasis 
In a manner similar to the Marine departments 
examined, the Beale Department conducts full spectrum F&ES 
classroom instruction and drills to ensure their 
firefighters are prepared to respond to a multitude of 
emergency scenarios. An additional commonality noted by the 
author regarding USAF and Marine F&ES training was the 
emphasis for Air Force firefighters (military and civil 
service alike) to achieve emergency service certifications 






Department Total F&ES 
Personnel 
Structural Firefighter II 
Certifications 
DoD ARFF  
Firefighter 
Certifications 
Beale FD 79 79 (100%) 68 (86%) 
 
Table 24 - Beale F&ES Certifications 
 
5. Manpower 
The organizational structure of the Beale Department 
is depicted for review.  
 





1. DoDI 6055.6 
Reference Paragraph 
E2.5.14.2 E2.5.14.3 E2.5.14.4  
2. Required Personnel 
per Reference 
11 2 89 102 
2a. Civilian 5 2 31 38 
2b. Military 6  0 48 54 
2c. Total (2a + 2b) 11 2 79 92 
3. Difference (1 – 2c) 0 0 -10 -10 
4. Reason for 
Shortfall 
    
4a. Deployment 0 0 0 0 
4b. Sickness or 
Disability 
0 0 0 0 
4c. Open Vacancy 0 0 0 0 
4d. Reserve 
Mobilization 
0 0 0 0 
4e. Unfunded Position  0 0 10 10 
4f. Other 0 0 0 0 
5. Action to Address 
Shortfall 
    
5a. Fill Action 
Initiated 
0 0 0 0 
5b. Reserve Backfill 0 0 0 0 
5c. Temp Position 0 0 4 4 
5d. Waiver 0 0 0 0 
5e. Other 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 25 - Beale Fire Department Manpower 
 
6. Department Input 
Interviews with the Beale Fire Chief, Mr. Randal 
Taylor, and the Department Deputy Chief, Master Sergeant 
David Romero, yielded insight to overall “good working 
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relations” between the military and Civil Service 
department manpower. Both the Chief and his deputy cited 
the following primary benefits to this emergency service 
organizational arrangement as noted: 
• Continuity: provided by civil service manpower, 
ensuring full F&ES support when military members must 
deploy. 
• Commonality: The majority (88%) of Beale’s Civil 
Service firefighters had prior military service. 
• Experience/Mentoring: The majority of Beale’s 
Civil Service manpower had 5 or more years with the 
installation department. Each Civil Service 
firefighter was noted as willingly able to mentor and 
provide training and experience/insight to junior 
firefighters. 
 
Individual interviews with 10 (5 military/5 civil 
service) Beale firefighters and Beale’s collective on duty 
shift (Section A) via a focus group-led discussion 
revealed, in general, the firefighters found the same 
benefits in their organizational arrangement as the 
management. Of the twenty Section A firefighters 
interviewed, one firefighter detailed a hardship with the 
integrated military/civil service organizational structure, 
being the “leadership challenges” posed to senior Air Force 
Military firefighters with respect to working with civil 
service firefighters with tenure and experience advantages. 
During the focus group interview the Beale 
firefighters readily admitted that there are distinct 
differences in civil service and military leadership 
standards and regulations; but also noted  the differences 
are expected and understood, and do not pose challenges to 
the discipline, morale or teamwork of the department. 
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E. NAVAL AIR STATION LEMOORE 
1. Installation Description 
With the transfer of NAS Miramar to the US Marine 
Corps, NAS Lemoore now hosts the Navy's entire 
west coast fighter/attack capability. NAS Lemoore 
was built “from the ground up” as a Master Jet 
Base, and has several operational advantages, and 
relatively few constraints, as a result.  
NAS Lemoore is the Navy's newest and largest 
master jet air station. The Pacific Strike 
Fighter Wing with its supporting facilities are 
home ported here. The primary aircraft based at 
NAS Lemoore is the F/A-18 Hornet Strike Fighter. 
In November, 1999, NAS Lemoore received its first 
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, which will eventually 
replace the F-14 Tomcat in fleet service as an 
air superiority fighter as well as assume, in a 
different configuration, the role of older F/A-18 
Strike Fighters. Currently, there are a total of 
175 Hornets and Super Hornets home-based at NAS 
Lemoore operating from two Fleet Replacement 
[training] Squadrons and ten Fleet [operational] 
Squadrons. In addition to the Hornet and Super 
Hornet population, NAS Lemoore also operates 
three UH-1N Search and Rescue Helicopters and 
hosts the UC-12B logistics aircraft.  
The station encompasses almost 30,000 acres, of 
which 18.784 are owned outright by the Navy, and 
11,020 more are used under air easement contract. 
The farmers owning or renting the land may raise 
crops in areas under the air easement but can 
only do so with the provision that no structure 
more than 25 feet in height – or any permanent 
living quarters – be built there. The operations 
and runway areas are located 7 miles from the 
administrative and housing areas of the base. 
Considering all population working, living or 
eligible for service on the base, NAS Lemoore is 
the fourth largest city in Kings County.  
The "Green Belt" is an area three miles wide 
adjacent to and extending completely around the 
Station. It was established by the Kings and 
Fresno Counties Planning Commissions to control 
all urban development in order to prevent future 
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problems incident to jet aircraft noise and 
population build-up adjacent to the station. The 
U.S. Navy presently out-leases 12,737 acres, 
resulting in revenues to the U.S. Government 
totaling over $1.3 million dollars a year and in 
land improvements valued at over $1 million 
dollars per year.  
Located in a rich agricultural area, NAS Lemoore 
offers sailors, Marines and civilians a small 
hometown atmosphere of rural America. Yet 
surrounding Lemoore are California's playgrounds 
- Los Angeles, San Francisco, the Sierra 
Mountains and the Pacific Ocean. NAS Lemoore is 
located in California's San Joaquin Valley, 
primarily in Kings County, 40 miles south of 
Fresno, 14 miles west of Hanford, and 7 miles 
west of Lemoore on State Highway 198. Fresno is a 
city of approximately 421,000 people while 
Hanford, the seat of Kings County and the 
location of most of the local government 
agencies, is approximately 42,000 people in size 
and growing rapidly. Lemoore’s population is half 
of Hanford’s, at 18,361.  
Commissioned in 1961, NAS Lemoore is the newest 
air station in the Navy. Two offset parallel 
runways were laid out 4,600 feet apart. Aircraft 
parking and maintenance hangars are aligned 
between the 13,500 foot runways. Separated from 
the hangars by an underpass beneath taxiway A, 
the remainder of the air operations area is 
located directly southeast.  
In July, 1998, NAS Lemoore was selected as the 
West Coast site for the Navy’s newest strike-
fighter aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. 
This action brings approximately 92 additional 
aircraft, 1,850 additional active duty personnel 
and 3,000 family members to NAS Lemoore and 
several associated facility additions or 
improvements.  
The Navy will bring four new fleet squadrons to 
Naval Air Station Lemoore over the period 2001-
2004. Additional military staffing will be 
required at Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance 
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Detachment, Strike Fighter Weapons School 
Pacific, and Naval Air Maintenance Training Group 
to support this effort.  
There are over 40 tenants onboard NAS Lemoore. 
The major ones include: Commander, Strike Fighter 
Wing Pacific Fleet; Carrier Air Wings 2, 9, 11, 
14; Strike Fighter Weapons School, Pacific; 
Strike Fighter Squadrons 22, 25, 94, 97, 113, 
115, 122, 125, 137, 146, 147, and 151; Fleet 
Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group, 
Pacific Fleet ; Marine Aviation Training Support 
Group; Naval Air Technical Services Facility 
Detachment; Naval Aviation Engineering Service 
Unit; Naval Air Maintenance Training Group; Naval 
Hospital and Branch Dental Clinic; Naval Training 
Systems Center; Trainer Systems Support Activity 
and Naval Air Reserve Center and Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Detachment.  
The relocation of fighter/attack assets, 
particularly F/A-18 squadrons from NAS Miramar to 
NAS Lemoore imposed additional airspace 
requirements at and near NAS Lemoore. The primary 
airspace resource used by Lemoore fighter 
missions is the R-2508 complex. The Foothills MOA 
is used to marshal aircraft prior to entering R-
2508. In addition, approximately ten sorties per 
day launch from Lemoore and proceed to the Fallon 
complex. The proximity and volume of airspace 
within the R-2508 complex is convenient and 
operationally suitable.  
The growth in activity in the area adjacent to 
the complex has exacerbated a long-standing 
dispute between the managers of the R-2508 
complex and the National Park Service regarding 
over flights of the Kings Canyon area. Recent 
agreements to limit over flights of the area in 
order to reduce perceived intrusions on the park 
were negotiated with the concurrence of senior 
leadership of both the local test communities and 
the primary operational user (COMNAVAIRPAC). 
Operational impacts are thus far not determined; 
perceptions of the agreement vary and appear to 
reflect the source. Some users note that the 
airspace can be used below the agreed FL180 
“standard mission” floor by simply requesting it, 
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while anecdotal comments attributed to groups and 
individuals opposed to military use of the 
airspace indicate that they believe they have 
effectively denied use of the area to the 
military.  
NAS Lemoore has long considered development of a 
MOA directly over the field. While this 
development has the potential to offer relief to 
constrained airspace, and especially to offer 
usable space for "low-end" activities (i.e. basic 
flight maneuvers, functional check flights), 
three factors will need to receive serious 
consideration prior to proceeding with any 
serious planning. The MOA must be evaluated for 
its potential impact on NAS Lemoore itself. 
Lemoore is relatively unconstrained by local 
operational ATC restrictions. Development and use 
of an overhead MOA may impose limitations on the 
airfield that outweigh the MOA's operational 
utility. The surrounding civil communities, while 
not immediately adjacent, are affected by ATC and 
airspace issues at Lemoore. Adjacent FAA-managed 
ATC facilities would have to be offered the 
opportunity to participate and have their 
concerns addressed in any development process, 
while the environmental effects of a new MOA, 
unless floored at an extraordinarily high level, 
would certainly invite a spirited public debate. 
An overhead MOA at Lemoore may offer only limited 
vertical airspace. Traffic bound to and from the 
Los Angeles area has been identified as a 
limitation to establishment of SUA/ATCAA at 
higher than low-sector (FL 230) altitudes. The 
area’s floor could be environmentally constrained 
(see above); in addition, discussions with 
airspace managers indicated that an existing tall 
transmitting tower could be a factor in the 
availability of low altitude airspace.36
 
 
 36 NAS Lemoore Installation Description, retrieved October 13, 2005 
from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/lemoore.htm
93 
2. Organizational Structure/Missions 
Lemoore’s Department (unlike Pendleton, Yuma or Beale) 
relies exclusively on Civil Service manpower to support 
full spectrum emergency service response, to include 
emergency service to the installation and tactical military 
aircraft (predominantly the F-18E/F Squadrons).   
An overview of the Lemoore emergency service core 
capabilities (based on input from key department management 
personnel) is provided for aggregate review. 
  
Primary Mission/Core Competencies NAS Lemoore  Fire Department
Aircraft Emergency Response X 
Structural Fire Response X 
EMT Response (Basic) X 
Hazardous Material Response X  
Wild Land Fire  X 
Confined Space Rescue X 
Medium Rescue X 
Agricultural Fire Response X 
Motor Vehicle Accident Response X 
 
Table 26 - NAS Lemoore F&ES Core Competencies 
 
3. Jurisdiction 
In addition to providing all emergency services aboard 
the installation, the Lemoore SFD maintains mutual aid 
agreements with both King and Fresno Counties. Lemoore 
Department also has primary emergency response to 10 miles 
of highway 198 (adjacent the installation). 
 
4. Training Emphasis 
Lemoore’s Department, much as the previous departments 
examined, conducts training to ensure responsiveness to the 
probable emergency service requirements of the 
installation. Classroom F&ES training and frequent drills 
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coupled with response to a myriad of emergencies has 
enabled the department to develop F&ES core competencies 
required to serve the installation.  
While the majority of training is facilitated on the 
air station within the department (senior personnel to 
junior, in accordance with DoD complaint NFPA/ProBoard 
Standards), Lemoore occasionally partners with Marine Corps 
Logistics Base Barstow and China Lake Naval Air Weapons 
Testing Center to facilitate emergency service training 
requirements. 
In addition to training conducted internally, 
Lemoore’s Fire Department augments aircraft firefighting 
training conducted aboard the installation by the Naval Air 
Technical Training Center. 
 








Lemoore FD 34 33 (97%) 32 (94%) 
 
Table 27 - Lemoore F&ES Certifications 
 
5. Manpower 
An aggregate overview of Lemoore’s F&ES manpower is 











1. DoDI 6055.6 
Reference Paragraph 
E2.5.14.2 E2.5.14.3 E2.5.14.4  
2. Required Personnel 
per Reference 
3 5 40 48 
2a. Civilian 3 5 34 39 
2b. Military 0 0 0 0 
2c. Total (2a + 2b) 3 5 34 42 
3. Difference (2-2c) 0 0 -6 -3 
4. Reason for 
Shortfall 
    
4a. Deployment 0 0 0 0 
4b. Sickness or 
Disability 
0 0 0 0 
4c. Open Vacancy 0 0 6 6 
4d. Reserve 
Mobilization 
0 0 0 0 
4e. Unfunded Position  0 0 0 0 
4f. Other 0 0 0 0 
5. Action to Address 
Shortfall 
    
5a. Fill Action 
Initiated 
0 0 6 6 
5b. Reserve Backfill 0 0 0 0 
5c. Temp Position 0 0 0 0 
5d. Waiver 0 0 0 0 
5e. Other 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 28 - NAS Lemoore Fire Department Manpower 
 
6. Department Input 
With respect to organizational composition of fire 
departments, Lemoore’s Chief (Jade Van Dyke) advocates 
“consistency” in department organizational structure to 
benefit operational response, management and administration 
of the Lemoore Department.  
The primary advantage Chief Van Dyke cited for an all 
civil service department was stability and continuity: “I 
do not have to worry about constant deployments disrupting 
department manpower with the labor structure the Navy has.”  
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The Chief also commented on his perspective of the 
advantage of maintaining one department per installation:  
Emergency incident command is enhanced in 
consolidated departments, whether the labor in 
the fire department is 100% military, 100% 
civilian or a mixture of both. Consider several 
of the mass casualty and terrorist attack drills 
we have had aboard Lemoore. Multiple agencies 
respond to these training scenarios, and from my 
experience, the more agencies involved, the more 
challenging and dynamic incident command becomes. 
Many of these difficulties stemmed from a lack of 
working familiarity between the Fire Department, 
Security Forces, and Medical Units - we (the 
Lemoore Command) have worked to improve multiple 
agency response coordination and incident 
command. Even with the progress that we have 
made, challenges do still exists. As the Fire 
Chief, I would not want to have to consider 
challenges posed by multiple fire departments 
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APPENDIX VI. F&ES QUESTIONNAIRE  
A. PURPOSE AND STATISTICS 
This questionnaire obtained input regarding Marine 
F&ES organizational change costs, benefits and alternatives 
from Tier 2 stakeholder leadership. 
The questionnaire was circulated electronically by the 
author directly to those Marine Departments participating 
in the installation Site Visits, and via Mr. Kevin King and 
CWO-5 Cernoch (HQMC F&ES) to other Marine emergency service 
departments. The below table provides a statistical 
overview of the questionnaires distributed and responses 
received. 
 
Department Total Questionnaires 
Distributed 
Total Questionnaire Responses 
Received 
Marine ARFF  20 5 (25%) 
Civil Service 
SFD  
11 5 (45%) 
 
Table 29 - F&ES Questionnaire Summary 
 
B. QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
The following details responses recurring from Tier 2 
leaders. 
 
Question 1. What are your top concerns with contracting for 
DoD F&ES?  
 
• Contracted F&ES is unable to support 
expeditionary F&ES needs of the Marine 
Corps. 
• Risks associated with commercial F&ES 
(performance, responsiveness and costs). 
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• Contractor focus on base payment, award, 
and/or fee instead of service to the 
government. 
• Contracted F&ES departments are less 
flexible to varying operations - contractors 
only perform the functions specified in a 
contract. 
• Contracted F&ES would not provide the same 
level of service as the current 
organizational structure. 
Question 2. How does Marine F&ES contribute to the synergy 
of overall Marine Corps Force Protection efforts and 
capabilities?  
 
• Both ARFF & SFD provide first response in 
areas of designated responsibility. 
• Through mutual aid agreements, ARFF and SFD 
provide augmentation for fire suppression, 
rescue and hazardous material response not 
only to each other, but to local 
municipalities and departments. 
Question 3. How do you view your department/unit operations 
with respect to operating efficiently? 
 
• Capability duplications between ARFF 
departments and SFD’s are perceived and not 
founded: each department has specialized, 
distinct mission requirements. 
• Structural F&ES training that Marines 
receive is under utilized. 
• Both ARFF and SFD’s train to the same DoD 
and NFPA standards, yet our departments are 
segregated. 
 
Question 4. What are the top positive and negative impacts 






• Elimination of duplications in senior F&ES 
management. 
• Overall increased flexibility and greater 
F&ES capability with a consolidated 
department synergism (due to   integrated 
training and operations). 
• More capable, qualified Marine firefighters 
deployed to support MWSS operations. 
• Greater overall continuity for aggregate 
F&ES installation operations. 
• Better assurance that firefighters with 
sufficient qualifications, certifications 
and licensing are assigned to department 
leadership positions. 
• More exposure to training and new response 
opportunities.    
• Better understanding of corresponding 
department operational responsibilities. 
• Consolidation may produce efficiencies in 
operating costs, resources and manning. 
• Consolidation would better entrench Marine 
F&ES against the threat of contracted F&ES. 
• Reduced overtime costs possible in a 
consolidated department due to larger 





• Marine warfighting ethos diminished if 
consolidated. 
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• Disagreement in authority (who will be the 
Fire Chief? The Section Leaders?). 
• Marine Corps firefighters will refuse to 
work for civil service firefighters. 
• Constant turnover of Marine firefighters 
requires civil service firefighters to 
continually train new personnel. 
• Possible increased F&ES operational costs 
during Marine deployments (overtime). 
• Inequity of duty assignments for uniformed 
Marine firefighters when compared to civil 
service firefighter duties. 
• Administration and management regulations 
for military and civil service personnel 
present significant cohesion and leadership 
challenges. 
• Diminished morale of work force if 
integrated. 
• Marine firefighters less familiar with SFD 
responsibilities, and the same of civil 
service firefighters with ARFF. 
 
What do you feel are the top benefits provided to 
Installation and MWSS F&ES through the Marine dual F&ES 
organizational structure? 
 
• Specialized emergency response capability is 
provided by each department. 
• Expeditionary nature of Marine F&ES makes 
the structure necessary. 
• With the dual organizational structure, 
Marine ARFF firefighters are able to provide 
for a wide variety of other services not 
related to F&ES, but essential to the Marine 
Corps (Burial Details, Color Guard, Augment 
Security Forces, etc…). 
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• Current organizational structure enables 
Marines to complete annual training 
(marksmanship, martial arts, etc…). 
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APPENDIX VII.  EXAMINING EXPEDITIONARY FIREFIGHTING 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix examines expeditionary emergency 
services supporting coalition forces in contingency 
environments to provide insight to deployed F&ES 
capabilities and challenges. This section reviews the 
utility of commercially sourced F&ES in Iraq, provides a 
statistical summation of OIF fatality sources and offers 
insight to challenges experienced by ARFF Marines that have 
recently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.     
 
B. OUTSOURCED F&ES 
The scope of contingency emergency service support 
provided by private industry to the military though 
substantial in capability is limited operationally. 
Consider Wackenhut Services Inc. (WSI), the largest F&ES 
provider in Iraq. As noted on the WSI web page: 
WSI Fire and Emergency Service in Iraq is the 
primary emergency response capability for 12 
United States DoD Fire Departments. The start-up 
of 12 fire departments simultaneously represents 
the largest single fire and emergency services 
effort in a combat zone in over 30 years and 
quite possibly in modern times. We are providing 
the DoD with a full service support program 
ranging from fire suppression, fire prevention, 
aircraft rescue and firefighting, technical 
rescue, hazardous materials, and basic life 
support services. Simply put, we protect those 
who are protecting the citizens of Iraq. 
Emergency services provided by WSI are comprehensive; 
however, an interview with Mr. Sam Brinkley (Lieutenant 
Colonel, USMC Retired) and Vice President, WSI Homeland and 
International Security Services, illuminated the need for 
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expeditionary firefighting by military personnel. As noted 
during a telephonic interview: 
Although WSI provides over 500 emergency 
responders possessing a multi-faceted capability 
(ARFF, Structural Firefighting and EMS) to 
coalition forces in Iraq, we provide support to 
base operations that are secure (provided 
security under the direction of Combatant 
Commanders) as part of contingency operations 
currently contracted through the U.S. Army’s 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). 
Expeditionary firefighting is beyond the scope of 
WSI’s mission - support to Forward Operating 
Bases (FOB’s) and Forward Area Refueling Points 
(FARP’s) is reliant on the COCOM’s warfighter’s 
for support. 
The limited operations of contracted F&ES to support 
Combatant Commands supports the operational requirement for 
uniformed Marine firefighters, and suggest continued 
operational reliance on uniformed Marine firefighters in 
the future.  
 
C. OIF STATISTICS 
As of 30 August 2005, an estimated 1,880 U.S. military 
fatalities have resulted from Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF).37 Of this total, 131 (7%) of these fatalities were 
the result of aviation related mishaps. Comparatively, 616 
(44%) of the fatalities were attributed to indirect hostile 
actions (Improvised Explosive Devices and mines) and non-
hostile events. These statistics demonstrate a need for 
enhancing F&ES core competencies of Marine firefighters, 
and suggest expanding F&ES capabilities to support Marine 
ground units. 
 37 Iraq Coalition Causalities, retrieved on August 30, 2005 from 
http://icasualties.org/oif/
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Total U.S. Military Fatalities from OIF as of 30 August 2005 1880 
Non-Hostile Fatalities * 209 
Hostile Fatalities Indirect in Nature ** 616 
Total Non-Hostile Fatalities & Indirect Hostile Fatalities  825 
Percentage Total Non-Hostile Fatalities & Indirect Hostile Fatalities  44% 
Hostile Fatalities Aviation Related *** 67 
Non-Hostile Fatalities Aviation Related **** 64 
Total Hostile and Non-Hostile Aviation Fatalities  131 
Percentage Total Hostile and Non-Hostile Aviation Fatalities  7% 
 
Table 30 - OIF Fatality Summary 30 August 2005 
 
Hostile - hostile fire - IED attack ** 486 25.9% 
Hostile - hostile fire 463 24.6% 
Non-hostile - vehicle accident * 150 8.0% 
Hostile - hostile fire - car bomb ** 73 3.9% 
Hostile - hostile fire - RPG attack 71 3.8% 
Hostile - hostile fire - mortar attack 68 3.6% 
Non-hostile - helicopter crash **** 59 3.1% 
Hostile - hostile fire – ambush 52 2.8% 
Hostile - helicopter crash *** 41 2.2% 
Non-hostile - weapon discharge 35 1.9% 
Hostile - hostile fire - suicide car bomb ** 30 1.6% 
Hostile - vehicle accident ** 26 1.4% 
Hostile - hostile fire – sniper 26 1.4% 
Non-hostile - unspecified cause 25 1.3% 
Hostile - hostile fire - suicide bomber 24 1.3% 
Hostile - helicopter crash (missile attack) *** 24 1.3% 
Hostile - hostile fire - rocket attack 22 1.2% 
Hostile - hostile fire – grenade 15 0.8% 
Non-hostile - unspecified injury 14 0.7% 
Non-hostile - weapon discharge (accid.) 14 0.7% 
Non-hostile - ordnance accident 14 0.7% 
Non-hostile - drowning * 13 0.7% 
Non-hostile – illness 12 0.6% 
Non-hostile - vehicle accident (drowning)* 12 0.6% 
Hostile - hostile fire – explosion 11 0.6% 
Hostile - hostile fire – bomb 8 0.4% 
Non-hostile – electrocution 8 0.4% 
Hostile - friendly fire 7 0.4% 
Non-hostile - illness - heart attack * 6 0.3% 
Non-hostile – homicide 5 0.3% 
Non-hostile - airplane crash **** 4 0.2% 
Non-hostile - illness - sudden collapse * 4 0.2% 
Non-hostile - accidental fall 3 0.2% 
Non-hostile - illness - died in sleep 3 0.2% 
Non-hostile - weapon malfunction 3 0.2% 
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Non-hostile - not reported 3 0.2% 
Hostile - hostile fire - suicide boat bomb 3 0.2% 
Hostile - drowning * 3 0.2% 
Hostile - hostile fire - land mine 3 0.2% 
Non-hostile 2 0.1% 
Hostile - jet crash *** 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - building fire * 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - accident (?) 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - heart attack? * 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - jet crash * 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - heat related * 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - heat related? * 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - heatstroke * 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - pneumonia? 2 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - seizure * 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile - maintenance accident 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile – suicide 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile - unspecified accident 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - heart failure * 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - acute leukemia 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - acute pancreatitis 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile - illness - breathing difficulties * 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile - vehicle accident * 1 0.1% 
Hostile - unspecified injury 1 0.1% 
Non-hostile – accident 1 0.1% 
Hostile - hostile fire - RPG attack (?) 1 0.1% 
Hostile - hostile fire – mine 1 0.1% 
Hostile - hostile fire - car bomb?/RP grenade? ** 1 0.1% 
Hostile - hostile fire - anti-tank mine 1 0.1% 
Hostile - friendly fire - cluster bomb 1 0.1% 
Hostile - friendly fire - jet crash **** 1 0.1% 
Total 1880 100.0% 
 
Table 31 - OIF Fatality Detailed Report 30 August 2005 
   
D. INTERVIEWS 
Interviews with several U.S. Marine ARFF members 
deployed in support of Operating Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
OIF provide testimony regarding the myriad of emergency 
service scenarios ARFF Marines are experiencing. While 
these interviews are not inclusive of all uniformed Marine 
firefighter deployed experiences, they certainly are 
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representative, and demonstrate a need for enhanced F&ES 
core competency development beyond service to aircraft. 
 
1. Sergeant Coscarelli 
While assigned to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 
Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) from August of 2001 
through January of 2002, Sergeant Coscarelli stated: 
I was attached to the 15th MEU, and was part of 
the amphibious landing into Pakistan, that 
eventually took the MEU into Afghanistan. Mostly 
I provided support to MEU and Special Forces 
helicopter operations at FARP (Forward Area 
Refueling Points) sites located outside of Camp 
Rhino (the MEUSOC base of operations during OEF). 
I responded to one aircraft related emergency 
while with the MEU, it was for an Army bird (CH-
46) full of Special Forces. The bird (aircraft) 
landed fine, and it did not amount to anything 
serious. I provided a lot of non-emergency 
services to MEU aircraft, mostly to helicopters 
that included landing the birds (ground control), 
grounding (preventing static discharge), rearming 
and refueling.  
My FARP was engaged by sniper fire one time. The 
Marines returned fire, and there were no injuries 
or damage to the birds (aircraft) or our 
equipment. During OEF the FARP teams I was 
assigned to were constantly busy (with aviation 
F&ES alerts, rearming and refueling), but I did 
not provide response to serious emergency 
situations.  
I also was in OIF with MWSS-373 from January 
through June of 2003. We were constantly busy 
while deployed, but the most memorable 
emergencies I will never forget. While working at 
a FARP site outside Tikrit, my ARFF team 
responded to a vehicle accident involving two 
HMMWVs. We rendered on scene EMS support at the 
accident. Also, I responded to an aircraft 
mishap- a UH-1 helicopter. A total of 3 of the 4 
souls on board died in the crash, however, my 
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ARFF team responded and provided EMS to the 
surviving co-pilot.  Also, we provided a lot of 
support to mortuary affairs. Fatalities and 
causalities would arrive at the FARP’s in 
tactical vehicles, and we transferred them to 
birds (helicopters) for further evacuation. It 
was a grim task at times.  
 
2. Master Sergeant Karambelas 
Assigned to MWSS 273, Master Sergeant Karambelas 
deployed to Iraq from March through September 2004. The 
Master Sergeant stated: 
MWSS-273’s ARFF was extremely taxed supporting 
the Al-Asad’s Forward Operating Base (FOB). The 
ARFF detachment was responsible for the Category 
2 Airfield sustaining 9 Marine squadrons. I 
served as the fire inspector for the entire FOB, 
which was a base of operations for well in excess 
of 10,000 personnel. Other than F&ES support of 
the airfield, MWSS-273 ARFF responded to several 
non aviation emergencies. 
The most notable of these responses was to a Navy 
Construction Battalion Work Center in Ramadi 
attacked by insurgents with rocket fire on May 9, 
2004. A total of 7 personnel were killed in the 
attack, and 38 wounded. ARFF Marines provided the 
initial response, established the triage, and 
rendered first response EMS. 
Also notable was MWSS-273’s response to a tent 
fire at RCT-7 that consumed 11 surface tents and 
destroyed $1.5 million dollars in equipment. ARFF 
provided first response to this fire, and with 
support from KBR’s (Kellogg, Brown, and Root) 
water tenders, we were able to contain the blaze. 
MWSS-273 responded to other non-aviation 
emergencies that included extinguishing four 7-
ton truck wheel fires, extrication of a motor-
transportation crew from an overturned 7-ton 
truck and extinguishing a host of smaller 
building and tent fires. 
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When I think back on the deployment, I personally 
provided fire prevention classes to over 4,000 
personnel and distributed over 5,000 smoke 
detectors and 3,000 extinguishers to units at Al-
Asad. I can’t stress enough the importance of 
fire prevention and inspection in contingency 
environments. With no fire hydrants and limited 
extinguishers, robust efforts in fire inspection 
and prevention were made. 
In general, the MWSS-273 ARFF did a phenomenal 
job in providing F&ES support at Al-Asad and the 
surrounding FARP sites, considering the 
relatively small amount of personnel and the 
equipment we had. Based on my deployed 
experiences, I believe there is a need for 
emergency service support external to the Marine 
Air Wings; however, without increases to F&ES T/O 
and T/E, I cannot reasonably see providing F&ES 
to ground units. Also the Marine Corps should 
consider increasing the number of new 
expeditionary firefighting vehicles, the Fire 
Suppression System (FSS). The P-19 is extremely 
old, and its large size proved difficult to 
maneuver in and out of base camp areas.  
 
4. Master Sergeant Jackson 
I deployed to OIF in February 2003 with MWSS-371. 
On our initial convoy from Kuwait to Iraq, the P-
19 (ARFF fire truck) I was in struck a land mine. 
Three other Marines and I were MEDEVAC’d 
(evacuated to medical care). I spent 5 days in a 
hospital but redeployed. I worked at several FARP 
sites. In July, my ARFF unit responded to a large 
wild land fire outside of Al-Kut. We had to 
protect a house that was being used to 
temporarily store a large quantity of unexploded 
ordinance. We also responded to a CH-46 that had 
a rotor-brake fire, and we responded to several 
smaller structural fires while deployed. 
 
5. Corporal Hein 
I was with MWSS-371 and deployed to OIF as a 
member of FARP Team B. I worked mostly outside 
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Tikrit, providing expeditionary airfield support 
(fire protection, refueling, ordinance support) 
to a wide variety of aircraft. Aside from FARP 
support, I was assigned frequently to security 
details. Several times my FARP site received 
small-arms and enemy rocket fire. Also, my ARFF 
team responded to an Army fuel truck that caught 
on fire. I am not sure how it happened, but we 
extinguished the blaze quickly.
 
E. SUMMARY 
Based on the constraints of contracted F&ES, the   
sources and spectrum of fatalities noted in review of OIF 
statistics and the testimony provided by ARFF Marines, the 
author suggests consideration of a future strategic vision 
for deployed Marine F&ES: Enhanced Expeditionary Emergency 
Service (EEES). 
EEES would extend beyond the MWSS to Marine Air Ground 
Tasks Force (MAGTF) and Combatant Commands (COCOMs), 
providing a multi-capable armored and motor vehicle 
extrication, CBRNE, Structural Fire, ARFF, EMS, Special 
Rescue, and Hazardous Material response capability.  While 
operational research develops technologies such as advanced 
armor systems, improvised explosive device (IED) 
“sniffers”, deployable robots, and other high-technology, 
expensive systems to counter asymmetric threats, these 
initiatives do not guarantee the safety of our personnel - 
nor do they provide critical emergency response if they 
fail.    
Although reactive, the establishment of EEES elements 
could enhance force protection measures by providing full 
spectrum F&ES utility to the MAGTF and COCOMs. The EEES 
concept may seem far fetched; however, the author asserts 
the enhanced F&ES core competencies developed by 
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Alternative 5 may provide the capability foundation for 
this initiative. Additionally, the labor efficiencies 
estimated with Marine F&ES consolidation may contribute to 
staffing the EEES vision. The author does not foresee 
attaching EEES teams to ground units, rather heliborne EEES 
teams providing rapid response to combatant commands over 
large sectors of battle space. Much in the same manner 
commercial emergency service corporations provide rapid 
heliborne response, special rescue, extrication and 
advanced life support within the civilian sector, EEES is 
envisioned to provide a similar, yet superior, F&ES 
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